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1 
ARTICLES 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE CONTRACTING AND THE 
RECIPROCITY NORM 
WENDY NETTER EPSTEIN* 
When governments outsource work to private entities—running prisons and 
schools, administering state benefits, and the like—they tend to write extremely 
detailed contracts.  The conventional thinking is that these private entities 
need to be constrained lest they act opportunistically.  Therefore, governments 
write contracts that highly specify tasks, contain robust monitoring provisions, 
and financially reward task compliance.  This detailed contracting approach, 
viewing agents as selfish, profit-driven, and looking for opportunities to shirk, 
finds support in both the agency cost and public law literatures. 
This Article challenges the prevailing approach.  It argues that control-
based contracts can be not only difficult and expensive to write and costly to 
monitor, but they can stifle intrinsic motivation and innovation.  Such 
detailed contracts frequently fail in practice with serious negative implications 
for the public. 
Recent literature in behavioral economics suggests that the conventional 
approach is actually premised on a misunderstanding of human 
nature.  Experiments on the positive reciprocity norm—meaning that people 
reward kind actions—have shown that less complete contracts induce higher 
effort levels and a more cooperative principal-agent relationship than the 
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traditional approach.  This Article incorporates this behavioral research and 
studies of real world behavior to present an interdisciplinary argument for why 
the traditional public-private contracting approach should be rethought, both 
in theory and in practice. 
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  INTRODUCTION  
After the Navy discharged Aaron Alexis, a petty officer third class 
with a checkered performance record, he found work with a military 
contractor.1  His job gave him access to sensitive military installations 
across the world.2  On September 16, 2013, he used that access to kill 
twelve people at the Navy Yard in Washington, D.C., less than two 
miles from the Capitol.3 
                                                          
 1.  Sari Horwitz et al., Navy Yard Gunman Had History of Mental Illness, Checkered 
Military Career, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/politics/alleged-navy-yard-gunman-had-checkered-military-career-officials-say/ 
2013/09/17/a136ad0c-1fa1-11e3-8459-657e0c72fec8_story.html. 
 2.   Id. 
 3.  Peter Hermann & Ann E. Marimow, Navy Yard Shooter Aaron Alexis Driven by 
Delusions, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/ 
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Edward Snowden, a high school drop-out turned computer whiz, 
parlayed a job as a security guard for the National Security Agency 
into information technology work at the Central Intelligence Agency.4  
After a couple of years, he left the CIA to become a subcontractor for 
the NSA.5  In May 2013, Snowden intentionally disclosed classified 
details of government surveillance programs to the press, creating 
tensions between the United States and some of its closest allies.6  He 
was subsequently charged with various acts of espionage.7 
Alexis and Snowden have one surprising thing in common.  They 
were both vetted by U.S. Investigative Services, Inc. (“USIS”), a 
private company the U.S. government contracted with to conduct 
background checks after the government had amassed an untenable 
backlog for top secret security clearances.8  By outsourcing to USIS in 
a $2.45 billion, five-year contract, the government hoped to harness 
                                                          
crime/fbi-police-detail-shooting-navy-yard-shooting/2013/09/25/ee321abe-2600-
11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html. 
 4.  Farhad Manjoo, If the NSA Trusted Edward Snowden with Our Data, Why Should 
We Trust the NSA?, SLATE (June 9, 2013, 7:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/ 
blogs/future_tense/2013/06/09/edward_snowden_why_did_the_nsa_whistleblower
_have_access_to_prism_and_other.html; Eric Schmitt, C.I.A. Warning on Snowden in 
‘09 Said to Slip Through the Cracks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2013/10/11/us/cia-warning-on-snowden-in-09-said-to-slip-through-the-cracks.html?_r=0. 
 5.  See Schmitt, supra note 4. 
 6.  Ellen Nakashima, Officials Alert Foreign Services that Snowden Has Documents on 
Their Cooperation with U.S., WASH. POST (Oct. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/world/national-security/officials-alert-foreign-services-that-snowden-has-
documents-on-their-cooperation-with-us/2013/10/24/930ea85c-3b3e-11e3-a94f-
b58017bfee6c_story.html. 
 7.  Id.; see also Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges Snowden with Espionage, 
WASH. POST (June 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/us-charges-snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-
92547bf094cc_story.html (detailing charges brought including two counts under the 
1917 Espionage Act); Schmitt, supra note 4. 
 8.  See Trip Gabriel, Shortcuts Seen by Firm Doing Security Checks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 
27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/28/us/pressure-reported-in-rush-to-
meet-security-clearances-including-edward-snowden-and-aaron-alexis.html 
[hereinafter Gabriel, Shortcuts] (explaining that government investigations for top 
secret level security clearances may take as long as 400 days, requiring the 
government to outsource to meet post-2001 demand for top secret cleared 
personnel); Dion Nissenbaum, Bottom Line Drove Security Clearances at USIS:  Company 
Rushed Investigations to Meet Targets, Former Employees Say, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230433090457913744332669
4158 (discussing USIS’s financial incentive to quickly process background checks); 
Jia Lynn Yang, Security-Clearance Contractor USIS’s Workers Felt Pressure to Do More and 
Faster, WASH. POST (Sept. 20, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-09-20/ 
business/42252868_1_usis-background-checks-edward-snowden (finding that many 
USIS employees felt pressured to perform their interviews quickly, not thoroughly).  
Alexis had a history of mental illness and previous gun-related charges, but USIS 
reported none of these details in its security clearance investigations.  Trip Gabriel et 
al., Suspect’s Past Fell Just Short of Raising Alarm, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2013/09/18/us/washington-navy-yard-shootings.html.  Snowden had 
previously been suspected of trying to hack into classified computer files while 
working for the CIA.  See Schmitt, supra note 4.  
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the speed, efficiency, and innovation of the private sector.  To 
incentivize such efficiency, USIS was entitled to payment only when it 
completed investigations.9 
USIS succeeded in eliminating the backlog on security checks.  But 
it did so in a way the government presumably did not intend.10  To 
meet revenue goals, particularly at month end, senior executives at 
USIS allegedly gave the directive to flush applications—simply 
approving them without review—so that the company could receive 
payment.11  In other words, USIS took shortcuts to accomplish so-
called efficient results.12 
The USIS example is not an isolated one.  Recent years have seen a 
government privatization frenzy fueled by faith that the private sector 
can outperform the government by reducing costs while improving 
service quality.13  But evidence is mounting that at least for certain 
types of services, governments are not seeing the predicted 
improvement in quality through outsourcing.14  Rather than reducing 
                                                          
 9.  See Gabriel, Shortcuts, supra note 8; see also S. REP. NO. 113-257, at 3–4 (2014) 
(reporting on a Department of Justice investigation that revealed that USIS 
submitted incomplete background checks in order to increase its revenues). 
 10.  See id. (describing that USIS had adopted a revenue-driven rather than 
quality driven work model); see also Safeguarding Our Nation’s Secrets:  Examining the 
Security Clearance Process:  Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Efficiency & 
Effectiveness of Fed. Programs & the Fed. Workforce and Subcomm. on Fin. & Contracting 
Oversight of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. 7–8, 32–
34 (2013) (statement of Patrick McFarland, Inspector Gen. for U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management). 
 11. Gabriel, Shortcuts, supra note 8. 
 12.  Christian Davenport, USIS Contracts for Federal Background Security Checks Won’t 
Be Renewed, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/ 
economy/opm-to-end-usis-contracts-for-background-security-
checks/2014/09/09/4fcd490a-3880-11e4-9c9f-ebb47272e40e_story.html 
(announcing, due in part to these issues, that the Office of Personnel Management 
would not renew any of its USIS contracts). 
 13.  See, e.g., Wendy Netter Epstein, Contract Theory and the Failures of Public-Private 
Contracting, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2211, 2214 (2013) [hereinafter Epstein, Contract 
Theory] (private contractors are perceived to be more efficient and cost effective than 
government agencies); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 
1025 (2013) (denoting the pervasive scope of modern day government contracting); 
GRANT THORNTON, THE STATE OF THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR INDUSTRY:  2010 1 
(2010), available at http://www.gt.com/staticfiles/GTCom/Government%20 
contractors/Government%20contractor%20files/GovConRdtble2010FINALpdf.pdf 
(noting the growth rate of government contracting industry despite the economic 
downturn in other sectors).  
 14.  See infra Part II (describing the spectrum of government service contracting 
and types of services most likely to have high agency costs); see also John D. Donahue, 
The Transformation of Government Work:  Causes, Consequences, and Distortions, in 
GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:  OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 41, 48 (2009) 
(suggesting that certain categories of services do poorly when privatized); David M. Van 
Slyke, The Mythology of Privatization in Contracting for Social Services, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 
296, 307–08 (2003) [hereinafter Van Slyke, Mythology of Privatization]; Jean Beuve & 
Lisa Chever, Quality of Outsourced Services, Rent-Seeking and Contract Design.  Evidence 
from Cleaning Contracts 2 (Chaire Economie des Partenariats Public Privé Institut 
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cost and improving service through innovation, private providers 
often reduce cost by cutting corners.15  This is the USIS story, but it is 
also the story of the company that ran a private halfway house that 
chose to reduce security to save money, a factor that contributed to 
inmate escapes.16  It is also the story of the private provider of state 
welfare services that allegedly skimped on personnel and made 
mistakes in coverage decisions, leaving needy applicants without 
crucial benefits.17 
This problem is well theorized by commentators as a principal-
agent problem.18  The interests of the government, as principal, do 
                                                          
d’Administration des Enterprises, Discussion Paper No. 2014-04, 2014), available at 
http://chaire-eppp.org/files_chaire/beuvechevermars2014_1.pdf (“postulating that the 
cost savings of outsourcing “might be achieved at the expense of quality”). 
 15.  See, e.g., supra notes 8, 10 and accompanying text (explaining how the 
increased revenue goal led to a decrease in quality of services in the USIS contract). 
 16.  See Sam Dolnick, At A Halfway House, Bedlam Reigns, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/18/nyregion/at-bo-robinson-a-halfway-
house-in-new-jersey-bedlam-reigns.html?_r=1&smid=fb-share (describing how the 
private organization falsified inmate records to reflect that the inmates were 
receiving therapy and other services at the halfway house). 
 17.  See Bowman v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 853 F. Supp. 2d 766, 768 (S.D. Ind. 
2012) (referencing the complaint, which alleged that the private contractor was 
negligent in its contractual obligations and failed to properly process the plaintiffs’ 
Medicaid claims); Privatization Myths Debunked, IN PUB. INT., http://www. 
inthepublicinterest.org/node/457 (last visited August 25, 2014) (listing several areas 
where privatization proved costlier and more inefficient than government led 
projects); see also Mike Brickner, States Should Run Screaming From the CCA to Avoid 
Dangerous and Disgusting Prisons, ACLU OF OHIO (Feb. 4, 2013, 12:11 PM), 
https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/states-should-run-screaming-cca-avoid-
dangerous-and-disgusting-prisons (detailing the numerous violations and problems 
at a privately run prison); Donald Cohen, Edward Snowden and the Disaster of 
Privatization, REUTERS (July 11, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/ 
07/11/edward-snowden-and-the-disaster-of-privatization/; Maria Dinzeo, $50 Million 
Computer Fiasco in Sacramento, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (Nov. 25, 2013, 9:59 AM), 
http://www.courthousenews.com/2013/11/25/63190.htm (detailing the failed 
attempt at privatizing the statewide payroll system in California); Michael D. Shear & 
Annie Lowrey, In Tech Buying, U.S. Still Stuck in Last Century, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/23/us/politics/in-tech-buying-us-still-stuck- 
in-last-century.html?_r=1& (explaining the government’s repeated failures at 
awarding successful technology contracts). 
 18.  See, e.g., Catherine Donnelly, Privatization and Welfare:  A Comparative 
Perspective, 5 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 336, 346 (2011) (recognizing that government 
outsourcing leads to a reversal of power in the principal-agent paradigm, giving the 
agent more power than the principal); Michaels, supra note 13, at 1027 (noting that 
privatization proponents look for ways to “align principal-agent incentives”); see also 
Mary S. Logan, Using Agency Theory to Design Successful Outsourcing Relationships, 11 
INT’L J. LOGISTICS MGMT. 21, 22 (2000) (exploring principal-agent power disparities 
through the lens of transportation outsourcing); Barbara S. Romzek & Jocelyn M. 
Johnston, State Social Services Contracting:  Exploring the Determinants of Effective Contract 
Accountability, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 436, 438 (2005) (explaining that the traditional 
principal-agent relationship in government contracts is not well suited for contracts 
in the social service sector); E.S. Savas, Privatization in State and Local Government, in 
RESTRUCTURING STATE AND LOCAL SERVICES:  IDEAS, PROPOSALS, AND EXPERIMENTS 91, 
99 (1998) (advocating for privatization because of its ability to increase savings 
without cutting services). 
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not align with the interests of the private provider, as agent.19  The 
private service provider seeks to increase profit by decreasing costs.20  
The government, at least in the most flattering view, is motivated to 
provide high quality service to its constituents.21  The way to solve this 
problem according to the prevailing literature is for the government 
to use the same approach to mitigating agency costs as contracting 
parties do in other contexts—write better contracts.22  “Better” 
contracts are ones that highly specify tasks and financially reward 
compliance with those tasks—so-called incentive-based contracting.23  
This approach assumes that rational, selfish actors are looking for 
opportunities to shirk. 
This Article challenges both the assumptions and the approach.  
While the traditional method may work well where tasks are easy to 
define and monitor and where there is a thick market with switching 
options, often when the government now outsources, such conditions 
are not present.  In addition, control-based contracts are not only difficult 
and expensive to write and costly to monitor, but they risk stifling 
                                                          
 19.  Donnelly, supra note 18, at 346. 
 20.  Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2218. 
 21.  See id. at 2216 (suggesting that the government may not always have an 
adequate incentive to provide quality service, especially to the disenfranchised, but 
assuming that governments would rather provide high quality service than low 
quality service when contracting out). 
 22.  See, e.g., Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1348 
(2012); see also H. EDWARD WESEMANN, CONTRACTING FOR CITY SERVICES 61–62 (1981) 
(listing provisions which may be mutually agreed upon within a city services 
contract); Trevor L. Brown et al., Managing Public Service Contracts:  Aligning Values, 
Institutions, and Markets, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 323, 327 (2006) (describing the areas in 
which the principal has the ability to fine tune contract specifications); Nestor M. 
Davidson, Relational Contracts in the Privatization of Social Welfare:  The Case of Housing, 
24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 263, 263 (2006) (“Commentators concerned with capturing 
privatization’s benefits and muting its potential harms often call for additional 
government control of private providers through their contractual agreements, 
specifying in ever-more-careful terms the scope of the engagement and monitoring 
providers with ever-greater oversight.”); Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 
115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1887 (2002) [hereinafter The Law of Prisons] (arguing that 
clarity is essential in developing a sound performance contract); Lisa A. Dicke, 
Ensuring Accountability in Human Services Contracting:  Can Stewardship Theory Fill the 
Bill?, 32 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 455, 465–66 (2002) (pointing out that government 
officials try to ensure quality contracting employees through strict contractual 
provisions); Jody Freeman, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 170–71 
(2000) (suggesting that “[c]ontracts could specify tasks more clearly, [and] detail 
procedures more thoroughly”); Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships:  
Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1267 (2003) (discussing 
contractual mechanisms for ensuring accountability to public values in the context of 
privatization); Romzek & Johnston, supra note 18, at 438 (finding that contractual 
language could alleviate many problems faced by public service government contracts). 
 23.  See Minow, supra note 22, at 1262–63 (discussing the benefits and challenges 
of using this model in the social services context). 
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intrinsic motivation and innovation.24  Such detailed contracts frequently 
fail in practice, with serious negative implications for the public.25 
This Article argues that where the traditional method does not 
work and a contractor performs a control-based contract poorly, 
governments should try the opposite and write less-detailed 
contracts.26  Although less-specified contracts may seem counter-
intuitive, a growing literature in behavioral economics on reciprocity 
supports this method.27  People reward kind actions but view control-
based contracts attempting to micromanage agent behavior as 
unkind.  How an agent perceives the kindness inherent in a contract 
affects the agent’s performance under the contract.28  Although this 
Article focuses on the government outsourcing example, a reciprocity-
based approach to contracting may be even more widely applicable.29 
There is now a robust experimental literature that assesses how 
reciprocity functions in a variety of simulated settings.30  The seminal 
works in this area were either completed by or inspired by Ernst 
                                                          
 24.  See, e.g., Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law:  On Contract Enforcement, 
Trust, and Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 132 (2001) (noting that for 
intellectually honest parties to a contract, strict contractual construction can be 
overly restrictive); Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments 
Examining the Effects of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
627, 659 (1999) [hereinafter Deci et al., Extrinsic Rewards] (positing that rewards are 
not an effective substitute for intrinsic motivation); Eileen Chou et al., The Control-
Motivation Dilemma:  Contract Specificity Undermines Intrinsic Motivation, 
Persistence, and Creativity 3–4 (2014) (under review at Organization Science) (on file 
with author) (demonstrating through experiment that less-specific contracts prompt 
intrinsic motivation in the employment context). 
 25.  See infra Part I.D; see also Praxis Solutions, Inc., Government Contracting and 
Competition—Another Principal-Agent Problem, 1 PRAXIS SERIES, no. IV, 2002, at 1, 4, 
available at http://www.praxisolutions.com/PrincipalAgent.pdf.  See generally PHILLIP 
J. COOPER, GOVERNING BY CONTRACT:  CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PUBLIC 
MANAGERS (2003).  
 26.  See infra Part III.B.   
 27.  See supra note 24. 
 28.  See infra Part III.A–B; see also Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and 
Retaliation:  The Economics of Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 170 (2000) 
[hereinafter Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation]; Ernst Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a 
Contract Enforcement Device:  Experimental Evidence, 65 ECONOMETRICA 833, 833 (1997) 
[hereinafter Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device] (discussing 
experimental evidence tending to show that people reciprocate fair or unfair 
treatment in kind and applying to contract context); Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-
Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1663 (2003) (discussing the 
Ultimatum Game, which revealed social preferences other than self-interest in the 
bargaining context). 
 29.  This Article focuses on public-private contracting because its common 
characteristics make control-based contracts a particularly poor fit.  Therefore, it is 
worth addressing public-private contracts first. 
 30.  See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Braiding:  The Interaction of Formal and Informal 
Contracting in Theory, Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1447 (2010) 
[hereinafter Gilson et al., Braiding] (collecting work). 
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Fehr.31  He found that in the contract context specifically, the 
inclination towards reciprocity translates into less complete contracts 
that induce a greater level of effort from agents than one would 
rationally anticipate.32  Other studies have confirmed similar results.33  
Findings in the regulatory context also support a less-detailed 
contracting approach, where real-world experiences launched a move 
away from command and control regulation toward a more flexible, 
standards-based regime.34 
This Article does not suggest that contracts should be completely 
devoid of content or direction.  All contracts exist on a spectrum of 
completeness.35  This Article does not intend to precisely identify 
where on the spectrum of completeness government service contracts 
should exist.  Rather, it suggests that the majority of contracts are too 
detailed and too complete, and that contracts should leave more 
discretion to the agent, fostering the agent’s sense of intrinsic 
                                                          
 31.  See, e.g., Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device, supra note 28, at 
834 (finding that reciprocity is supported by scientific study); Fehr & Gächter, 
Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 159 (finding that economic analysis supports 
the theory that human beings are inclined to fairness and are not solely self-motivated).  
 32.  Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device, supra note 28, at 834.  
 33.  See, e.g., Bohnet et al., supra note 24, at 131–51 (finding incentive contracts 
decrease cooperation); Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation Crowding Theory:  A 
Survey of Empirical Evidence, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 589, 589–612 (2001) (suggesting that 
monetary incentives are not as effective as reciprocity arrangements for providing 
motivation); Judd B. Kessler & Stephen Leider, Norms and Contracting, 58 MGMT. SCI. 
62, 62 (2012) (discussing experiment finding unenforceable “handshake 
agreements” to be most effective); Mark Lubell & John T. Scholz, Cooperation, 
Reciprocity, and the Collective-Action Heuristic, 45 AM. J. POL. SCI. 160, 175–76 (2001) 
(finding that the use of incentives can crowd out reciprocity); Ernst Fehr & Simon 
Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary Cooperation? 13–14 (Inst. for 
Empirical Research in Econ., Discussion Paper No. 3017, 2000) [hereinafter Fehr & 
Gächter, Crowd Out] (reporting that the incentive contract may not be better than 
the pure trust contract); Chou et al., supra note 24, at 2–4 (demonstrating the 
crowding out effect of specified contracts in employment contract setting); see also 
Scott, supra note 28, at 1644–45 (showing that experimental study results may predict 
“deliberately incomplete agreements between strangers is more efficient than the 
alternative of more complete, legally enforceable contracts).  But see Mary Rigdon, 
Trust and Reciprocity in Incentive Contracting 18 (Nat’l Sci. Found., Working Paper, 
2006) (finding no evidence that incentives “crowd out” social norms). 
 34.  Cf., JOHN MIKLER, GREENING THE CAR INDUSTRY:  VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE 72–73 (2009) (Japanese car industry motivated by internal sources, 
not detailed regulation); John Braithwaite, Rules and Principles:  A Theory of Legal 
Certainty, 27 AUSTL. J. L. PHIL. 47, 68 (2002) (exploring a study of the role of 
regulations in the British finance industry, and identifying a trend away from binding 
rules and towards broad principles). 
 35.  See, e.g., Trevor L. Brown et al., Contracting for Complex Products, 20 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY i41, i43 (2010) (“Contract completeness is the degree to which 
the contract defines buyers’ and sellers’ rights and obligations across all future 
contingencies.”); Scott, supra note 28, at 1641–42 (explaining that all contracts are 
incomplete to some degree). 
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motivation.36  While contracts cannot be silent about goals or desired 
outcomes, they also should not dictate precisely what steps be taken 
to achieve those goals or desired outcomes. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts.  Part I describes in principal-
agent terms how government service contracting in certain contexts 
results in cost cutting but fails to improve service quality.  It then 
explores current scholarship suggesting mechanisms to solve the 
problem through detailed contracting.  There has been significant 
discourse on this issue in both the public law literature and amongst 
economists who write about best practices in contracting. 
Part II explains why the solution that theory predicts to mitigate 
agency costs (control-based contracting) does not work well in 
certain contexts.  The discussion sets out a multi-dimensional 
spectrum and suggests that when governments contract out services 
(1) for which the provider market is thin, (2) where tasks are 
complex and difficult to specify, and (3) where effective monitoring 
is elusive, the detailed contracting approach is biased to be ineffective. 
Part III sets out the alternative proposal.  Where writing highly 
detailed contracts is not optimal, there is another option.  Part III 
explores the experimental literature on positive reciprocity in 
contracting.  It suggests there is reason to be optimistic about the 
potential for less detailed contracting and parties’ abilities to rely on 
the reciprocity norm as a contract enforcement device.  Although this 
research is very promising, and an analogy to the regulatory context 
provides real-world examples, work in this area is still preliminary.  
Accordingly, Part III also discusses this approach’s potential limitations 
and offers suggestions for further study.  Ultimately, Part III leaves 
open the possibility that reciprocity-based contracting might have 
even broader application outside the government outsourcing context. 
I. PRIVATIZATION FAILURES AND THE CURRENT              
CONTRACTING APPROACH 
Widespread budget crises and general complaints of government 
inefficiency have served to heighten the role for the privatization37 of 
                                                          
 36.  See Ian R. Macneil, Contracts:  Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under 
Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 890–91 
(1978); Scott, supra note 28, at 1644–45 (reciprocity is an effective motivator for half 
of the population). 
 37.  The terms “privatization,” “public-private contracting,” “government 
outsourcing,” “government service contracting,” “contracting out,” and “purchase-of-
service (POS) contracting,” all may mean different things in different contexts.  But 
for purposes of this Article, they are used interchangeably to indicate a contract 
between a governmental entity and a private party, where the private party agrees to 
provide a government service for the benefit of the public in exchange for 
EPSTEIN.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2014  2:43 PM 
10 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1 
government services in recent years.38  Perhaps it is unsurprising that 
in the current economic climate, where state budgets in particular 
are very lean, the use of privatization is on the rise and has enjoyed 
widespread support across the political spectrum.39 
A. Why Governments Privatize 
Privatization theory suggests that privatizing should both cut costs 
and simultaneously maintain or even improve service quality.40  
Privatization proponents argue that governments lack adequate 
incentives to work efficiently and to innovate to provide high quality 
services at low cost.41  Because governments are not motivated by 
seeking profits or maximizing value and do not face competition for 
the provision of services,42 governments lack market motivation to 
deliver services efficiently.43 
Further, even with the proper incentives, governments are not 
particularly adept at delivering services efficiently because they are 
constrained by bureaucracy and civil services laws.44  Governments 
lack the options to motivate their employees that private firms 
                                                          
compensation by the government.  See, e.g., Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 
22, at 161 (recognizing that the bulk of privatization in the U.S. has taken the form 
of government contracting); Michaels, supra note 13, at 1026 (explaining the nature 
of public-private contracts).  This Article does not address procurement contracts. 
 38.  Anna Ya Ni & Stuart Bretschneider, The Decision to Contract Out:  A Study of 
Contracting for E-Government Services in State Governments, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 531, 532 
(2007) (“As a result [of a growing desire to make government more efficient], 
government contracts with the private and nonprofit sectors have rapidly increased 
in volume and extended to various service areas.  Indeed, the market for contracts to 
provide government services has been growing faster than that of any commercial 
segment.” (citations omitted)). 
 39.  See Michaels, supra note 13, at 1025 (noting that privatization is a politically 
expedient means of addressing many governmental services). 
 40.  See, e.g., The Law of Prisons, supra note 22, at 1877–78 (early economic models 
actually predicted that privatization would reduce both cost and quality, but recent 
literature argues that private contractors may be motivated to innovate in a way that 
cuts cost but not service quality). 
 41.  Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1445 (2003). 
 42.  Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2235–38. There are exceptions—
for instance, the United States Post Office—but generally speaking, this is true. 
 43.  Id. at 2238.  Governments arguably do, however, have political motivations to 
deliver efficient service.  The problem is, therefore, more pervasive when politically 
disenfranchised groups are the service recipients.  Id. 
 44.  David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the Poor, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 
393, 400–01 (2008) (noting that the complexity of services that a government may 
contract out for results in intrinsic difficulties in accomplishing contractual goals).  
See generally E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION:  THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT pt. 3 (1987) 
(describing the historical background of privatization). 
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enjoy.45  Most government employees are not at-will, and therefore 
the government cannot easily terminate their employment.46  The 
government also has fewer tools in its tool belt, such as access to 
bonuses or the ability to quickly advance high performers. 
By contrast, private firms that do seek to maximize profits and do 
have competitors in the marketplace will, in theory, be driven to 
innovate and to provide services that are both high quality and low 
cost.  Private firms derive motivation from winning contracts and 
then keeping the business.47  If a private firm does not deliver in a 
marketplace where there are true switching options, the firm will lose 
the contract at renewal (or earlier).48  Individual employees of profit-
seeking firms may also share the motivations of their parent firms.49  
Indeed, firms take pains to align employees’ incentives with their own 
by rewarding performance that furthers the firm’s profit-maximizing 
goals and by punishing performance (perhaps even by termination of 
employment) when employees’ work is unsatisfactory.50  Private 
entities can also adjust staffing and wage levels more readily than the 
government and raise capital where necessary.51 
                                                          
 45.  See Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2243 (explaining how private 
sector employees’ economic welfare is often tied to the overall performance of their 
employer, a scenario that largely does not exist for government employees). 
 46.  PATRICIA H. WERHANE ET AL., EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 54, 55 
(2004) (contrasting about fifty-five percent of private sector workers who are at-will 
against government employees with some job security). 
 47.  See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 41, at 1429 (opining that private firms 
consistently out-perform comparable government services because private firms are 
able to utilize the principle that maximizing profits is a socially desirable goal). 
 48.  Id. at 1428. 
 49.  See WERHANE, supra note 46, at 54–55. 
 50.  See id. (examining the difference in motivation that job security has on 
private and public employees). 
 51.  See E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 111–12 
(2000) [hereinafter SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS ]; Super, 
supra note 44, at 409–13 (using private entities’ choice of internal production over 
obtaining goods or services from the open market to illustrate firms’ increased 
flexibility in comparison to the government); see also DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, 
REINVENTING GOVERNMENT:  HOW THE ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 252–53 (1992) (finding that decentralized institutions offer a greater 
degree of flexibility and adaptability than their centralized counterparts); Michaels, 
supra note 13, at 1088; David M. Van Slyke, Agents or Stewards:  Using Theory to 
Understand the Government-Nonprofit Social Service Contracting Relationship, 17 J. PUB. 
ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 157, 158 (2006) (“Privatization advocates argue that 
government will receive better services at lower costs because of the expertise and 
innovation of private providers.  This argument rests on ‘introduc[ing] competition 
and market forces in[to] the delivery of public services.’” (quoting SAVAS, 
PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 51, at 122)). 
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B. Principal-Agent Problems 
Contracting out is not without problems.  In a prior Article, I 
suggested that there are systematic biases in certain types of 
government outsourcing such that cost cutting is prioritized over 
quality service provision.52  I argued that this is particularly true where 
markets are thin, where tasks are difficult to specify and monitor, and 
where the outsourced service benefits a small, often disenfranchised 
portion of the population.  In such scenarios, I conceived of the cost 
that contracting parties impose on service recipients as akin to a 
negative externality that the transacting parties are not forced to 
internalize.  Thus, what appears to be a cost-saving mechanism is 
often, in fact, a systematic market failure. 
In this Article, I continue to explore the problem of the poor 
service provision that can result when governments outsource, but 
instead of focusing on incentive mismatches between the contracting 
parties and third-party beneficiaries, I focus on incentive 
misalignments between the contracting parties themselves.  Here, I 
assume that a government’s goal in outsourcing is to provide good 
quality service (and not only to reduce cost no matter the effect on 
service quality), but that governments have difficulty obtaining good 
service from the private providers to which it outsources.  This is a 
type of agency cost.  Whenever one party (the agent) contracts to 
perform a service on behalf of another (the principal), the goals of 
the two parties are likely to not entirely align.53  Principal-agent 
theory addresses the difficulties involved when a principal motivates 
its agent to act in the best interests of the principal rather than in his 
or her own interests.54 
Agency problems often arise when there is information 
asymmetry.55  The agent is the party performing the service.  The 
principal does not know as much about that service provision as the 
agent actually performing the service.  Consider a provider of call 
center services that obtains a contract to handle customer service calls 
on behalf of a retail store.  Those actually handling the calls know far 
                                                          
 52.  Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2238.  
 53.  KIERON WALSH, PUBLIC SERVICES AND MARKET MECHANISMS:  COMPETITION, 
CONTRACTING AND THE NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT 36–37 (1995); Brian Galle, Charities 
in Politics:  A Reappraisal, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1561, 1591–92 (2013). 
 54.  WALSH, supra note 53, at 37. 
 55.  See Kathleen M. Eisenhardt, Agency Theory:  An Assessment and Review, 14 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 57, 58 (1989) (finding that the “agency problem” arises when a 
principal and their agent have different attitudes towards control and risk); Michael 
C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 309 (1976) (noting that agency costs rise 
when the relationship and knowledge between principal and agent is not clearly defined). 
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better the level of service they are providing than the store on whose 
behalf the customer service representatives are acting.  In this 
situation, principals can have difficulty ascertaining whether or to 
what extent a contract has been satisfied.  The principal removed 
from the agent cannot fully monitor its services or it may be too costly 
to adequately monitor.56 
If the incentives of the agent and principal are not aligned, and the 
agent knows that the principal cannot easily detect its actions, the 
agent will act in ways that the principal would not want it to act.  This 
is known as moral hazard.57  Typical examples of these sorts of agency 
costs are those that arise between corporate management (agent) 
and shareholders (principal).58  The principle extends to the 
relationship between politicians as agent and voters as principal.  In 
the management-shareholder context, management might lack 
sufficient incentive to maximize profits of the firm and might instead 
prefer to maximize personal gain.  If the shareholders cannot easily 
detect that management is furthering personal gain rather than the 
interests of the company, management will be more likely to act in 
ways shareholders might frown upon.  The political context can be 
similar.  There, voters select their representatives to act in their best 
interests, but once elected, representatives may act in ways that will 
maintain their positions of power rather than fulfill their promises to 
constituents.  Both examples illustrate the problems that may arise 
from misaligned incentives. 
The example of the USIS contract discussed above also has these 
attributes.59  The contract incentivized completing the review of 
applications for security clearance.  USIS was therefore motivated to 
“complete” applications rather than to do quality investigations.  The 
agency costs in that situation resulted from both incentive 
misalignments (in part created by the payment mechanism under the 
contract)60 and from information asymmetry.  USIS was better 
                                                          
 56.  See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 55, at 309 n.10; Steven Shavell, Risk Sharing 
and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55, 66 (1979). 
 57.  Schavell, supra note 56, at 66. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
 60.  Gabriel, supra note 8 (“In interviews this week, former and current USIS 
employees detailed how the company had an incentive to rush work because it is 
paid only after a file is marked ‘FF,’ for fieldwork finished, and sent to the 
government.  In the waning days of a month, investigations were closed to meet 
financial quotas, without a required review by the quality control department, two 
former senior managers said.”).  There was surely a better way to draft this contract 
to better align incentives in the traditional model, but even so, this Article argues 
that a better contract is not one predicated on that approach.  Rather, a better 
EPSTEIN.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2014  2:43 PM 
14 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1 
positioned to know how thoroughly it had reviewed applications.  The 
government was at an informational disadvantage.  The ramifications of 
subpar contractor performance in that case were severe.61 
A related issue to information asymmetry and moral hazard is that 
even if the principal can obtain contract compliance from the agent, 
it may have difficulty prompting best efforts.62  The literature 
differentiates between perfunctory performance and consummate 
performance.63  Perfunctory is performance within the letter of the 
contract, and consummate is performance within the spirit of the 
contract that goes beyond what is required in pursuit of a greater win-
win gain.64  For instance, a contract may specify the number of jokes a 
comedienne must tell, but it would be essentially impossible to specify 
how funny her jokes must be.  A perfunctory comedienne performing 
just what is required will simply tell the required number of jokes and 
will be satisfied by a reaction of mild giggles.  A consummate 
comedienne will work to obtain the big laughs.  One difficulty that 
principals face is in motivating agents to give consummate rather than 
perfunctory performance.65  This is particularly true where accepted and 
objective metrics for consummate performance are lacking.66 
This issue is often apparent in government outsourcing contracts.67  
Governments contract out to private providers to decrease cost, but 
                                                          
contract may simply be a less-specific one that trades on the reciprocity value 
between the parties. 
  61.  For additional examples of government contractors delivering subpar 
performance due to agency costs, see Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2220–26. 
 62.  See Ernst Fehr et al., Contracts as Reference Points—Experimental Evidence, 101 
AM. ECON. REV. 493, 518–22 (2011) (considering two different models regarding 
social preferences, one based on inequity aversion and one based on reciprocity, for 
explaining fairness theories in contractual relationships); Yuval Feldman et al., 
Reference Points and Contractual Choices:  An Experimental Examination, 10 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 512, 520 (2013); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 
123 Q.J. ECON 1, 7–8 (2008) (postulating that a party to a contract may only put forth 
his best efforts if he feels as though he is treated well). 
 63.  Hart & Moore, supra note 62, at 6. 
 64.  Id. at 6–8.   
 65.  See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES:  ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS 100–01 (1975); Hart & Moore, supra note 62, at 7; George S. 
Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 974 
(2007) [hereinafter Geis, Business Outsourcing] (possible risks stemming 
from agency cost problems include “(1) insufficient effort or shirking; (2) lavish 
compensation or self-dealing; (3) entrenchment; and (4) poor risk management”). 
 66.  Motivating consummate performance is not as problematic when easily 
observable and measurable performance metrics are available. 
 67.  See, e.g., Donnelly, supra note 18, at 346 (explaining that, in the context of 
governmental outsourcing, the agent has first-hand knowledge, and so it is the agent 
that has the most influence). 
EPSTEIN.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2014  2:43 PM 
2014] PUBLIC-PRIVATE CONTRACTING 15 
also to improve service quality.  However, the contractor may be 
tempted to provide lower effort levels than the government may want.68 
Oliver Hart gives the example of a prison manager who can make 
two kinds of investments:  “He can invest in efficiency-enhancing 
ideas that raise the quality of prison services, e.g., develop new 
rehabilitation programmes; he can also spend time figuring out how 
to cut costs and quality, while staying within the letter of the 
contract.”69  A government’s goal, then, is to maximize its agent’s 
innovative investment while minimizing the quality-shading 
investment.  Often, in practice, and for particular categories of 
contracts,70 the quality-shading kind of investment is what results. 
For instance, the City of New York outsourced welfare-to-work 
services to private vendors.71  The goal of the project was to move 
people into jobs that would permit economic independence.72  The 
private vendors, which were paid based on placements, worked to 
place the easiest candidates and ignored the more difficult cases.73  
They also targeted short-term job placement that was unlikely to 
stick.74  They complied with the letter of the contract, but did not 
perform as the government would have liked. 
Agency theory focuses on correcting for opportunistic behavior 
that can result from misaligned incentives and exploiting asymmetric 
information.75  It typically suggests aligning incentives such that the 
rational, self-interested choices of the agent comport with the 
principal’s choices.  In outsourcing, agency theory focuses on the 
ways in which principals can try to align incentives through contract. 
                                                          
 68.  See Oliver Hart et al., The Proper Scope of Government:  Theory and an Application 
to Prisons, 112 Q.J. ECON. 1127, 1141 (1997); Peter H. Kyle, Note, Contracting for 
Performance:  Restructuring the Private Prison Market, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2087, 2095 
(2013) (explaining that public service employees often lack motivation because they 
see little return on cost reductions and quality improvements). 
 69.  Oliver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Public Ownership:  Remarks, and an 
Application to Public-Private Partnerships, 113 ECON. J. C69, C71 (2003). 
 70.  See infra Part II (discussing frequently used types of government contracts). 
 71.  See Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power:  Reconfiguring 
Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275, 286 & n.41 (2009) 
(describing the failure of New York’s Employment Services and Placement program). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See id. at 291 (“[T]he incentives are structured in a way that encourages 
vendors to work with those easiest to place quickly, and leave behind those that need 
more support and more time for initial placement.  Clients realize this and grow wary 
of a system that is failing to meet their needs.”). 
 74.  Id. at 287. 
 75.  Donnelly, supra note 18, at 346–47 (explaining “asymmetric information,” a 
problem that comes about when a private provider may have information that the 
government does not, and the private provider is then motivated to further its own, 
rather than the public’s, interest). 
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Public law scholars who address this same problem typically focus on 
accountability issues rather than agency cost.76  The focus is on providing 
voters a mechanism for policing the government.  Accountability, for 
public law scholars, is the “central issue” in privatization. 
In turning to private actors to supply education, social services, 
dispute resolution, and other programs to meet basic human needs, 
governments may duck public obligations and rules, become too 
closely enmeshed with religion, or divert public resources to private 
profits without gaining the discipline of a true economic market.  
Rather than achieving increased efficiencies and improved options, 
then, the privatization process risks reduced quality, unequal 
treatment, and outright corruption.77 
Although the public-private contracting problem does not 
necessarily stem from the relationship between the two contracting 
parties, Minow and others turn in part to contract solutions to 
address accountability concerns.78  The next section takes up this 
issue further, exploring the common mechanisms for mitigating 
agency costs (or ensuring more accountability), which are also the 
most common mechanisms suggested and likely employed in 
government service contracts. 
C. Scholarly Solutions to Principal-Agent Problems 
There is much congruence in the literature that careful contract 
design can align incentives.79  The literature contemplates a 
                                                          
 76.  Because I concentrate on contractor performance in this Article, I conflate 
the accountability and agency cost analysis, which ultimately both suggest that 
detailed contracting is the way to improve performance.  However, there are crucial 
differences in the two analyses, most importantly, that many public law scholars 
concerned about accountability are concerned about accountability to the public, not 
just to the government.  For instance, making government contracts publicly 
available is an equally important dimension to solving this problem. 
 77.  Minow, supra note 22, at 1246; see also Kimberly N. Brown, “We the People,” 
Constitutional Accountability, and Outsourcing Government, 88 IND. L.J. 1347, 1350–52 
(2013) (addressing and explaining the “Accountability Problem of Privatized 
Government”); Donnelly, supra note 18, at 339–40 (using a comparative approach to discuss 
challenges to accountability and human rights that arise from using privatization in the 
welfare context); Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1317–20, 1342 (2003) (suggesting ways to prevent governments 
from avoiding duties by turning to private actors); Janna J. Hansen, Note, Limits of 
Competition:  Accountability in Government Contracting, 112 YALE L.J. 2465, 2475 (2003) 
(arguing that the contracting process of private government contractors is often 
confidential and without judicial review, leading to accountability issues). 
 78.  Minow, supra note 22, at 1260–61 (discussing contractual mechanisms for 
ensuring accountability to public values in the context of privatization). 
 79.  See, e.g., MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM:  GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL 
CLAIMS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS 144–45 (2000) (discussing ways to avoid major 
sources of conflict, thus aligning incentives); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, 
Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 226 (1990) 
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multiplicity of ways to align incentives, from profit sharing to piece-
rate compensation to bonding, among others.80  Most relevant for 
present purposes is the method that suggests highly specifying tasks 
and/or outcomes, monitoring, and relating performance to financial 
punishments or rewards due ex post.81 
1. Mitigating agency costs through specification, monitoring, and incentive-
based compensation 
Agency theory assumes that agents are rational, selfish actors looking 
for opportunities to shirk under a contract.  A rational agent that knows 
its actions cannot be adequately detected by a principal will act to 
maximize its own profit even in ways the principal may not want.  
Accordingly, a principal may better position itself by designing a 
contract that aligns incentives so that an agent will be honest and follow 
the rules.  Contracts must work within incentive compatibility constraints. 
a. In general 
First, specifying tasks can be an important contracting 
mechanism.82  Although scholars have established that no contract 
can be entirely complete,83 there are nonetheless a number of 
benefits to specifying tasks.  It gives the agent guidance on exactly 
what is required so that expectations are aligned.  And it gives the 
principal something to monitor or with which to ensure compliance.  
It also limits the risk of a court later wrongly interpreting contractual 
intent.84  Ultimately, the argument is that specification of tasks is 
necessary for agent accountability.85 
                                                          
(examining the relationship between contract clarity and compensation policy); 
Sidney A. Shapiro, Outsourcing Government Regulation, 53 DUKE L.J. 389, 394 (2003) 
(discussing the continual negotiation process that accompanies an incomplete 
contract); cf. Rigdon, supra note 33, at 18, 25 (noting that further study should be 
conducted on how to efficiently structure incentives through contracting). 
 80.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, The Regulator Effect in Financial Regulation, 98 
CORNELL L. REV. 591, 603 (2013) (suggesting several different methods used to aid 
principals and agents in aligning interests). 
 81.  See, e.g., Hart, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 69, at C70 (noting the 
prevailing sentiment that a government need not own a firm to control its behavior:  
“any goalseconomic or otherwisecan be achieved via a detailed initial contract”). 
 82.  See Margaret M. Blair et al., Outsourcing, Modularity, and the Theory of the Firm, 
2011 BYU L. REV. 263, 263 (stating that large projects can be broken down into 
smaller “modular” tasks).  
 83.  See Hart, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 69, at C71 (positing that no contract 
is considered complete in the property rights model). 
 84.  See Dru Stevenson, Privatization of Welfare Services:  Delegation by Commercial 
Contract, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 83, 121 (2003). 
 85.  In the corporate context, however, there tends to be less reliance on task 
specification.  Particularly where managers can be given flexibility but are 
incentivized to maximize firm profit, it is less necessary and perhaps less desirable to 
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Second, and related, monitoring (either directly or through 
market mechanisms) can be an essential component of mitigating 
agency costs.86  Explicit monitoring rights in transactions range from 
audit procedures to in-person visits to observe the agent in practice.87  
Monitoring is costly, but it is generally required to reduce an agent’s 
temptation to engage in self-interested behavior that will harm the 
enterprise or, in other words, to reduce the information asymmetry 
that contributes to agency costs in the first place.88  In corporate 
contexts, the market may do some of the work aligning incentives.89  
Particularly if the principal may become aware of an agent shirking, 
the principal will utilize switching options, and the agent will suffer 
reputational sanctions.90  Therefore, a thick market and good 
information can dissuade agents from performing poorly.91 
Third, the literature recommends the use of performance-based 
compensation to align interests.92  Fixed payment regimes 
unconnected to performance or task completion may do little to 
incentivize agents to do good work.93  There are, however, many ways 
to use compensation to motivate agents.  Options range from 
payment for achieving certain pre-defined goals to penalties for 
failure to achieve goals.94  Other incentives aligning compensation 
are also available.  What has become the traditional example is 
                                                          
specify tasks too discretely.  William J. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in 
the Market for Corporate Control:  An Agency Cost Model, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 385, 416 
(suggesting that firms generally prefer to motivate managers through the use of 
incentives, rather than to specify the manager’s duties). 
 86.  Jensen & Meckling, supra note 55, at 323–24. 
 87.  See Geis, Business Outsourcing, supra note 65, at 993 (explaining that there are 
several ways to mitigate costs, including writing monitoring into the contract or the 
practice of extensive audits). 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See Carney, supra note 85, at 387 (positing that incentives can often be 
aligned in the corporate context through compensation provisions). 
 90.  See Davidson, supra note 22, at 306, 313 (hypothesizing that a relational 
approach may minimize instances of shirking and that incentivizing providers may 
help to avoid a stain on the government’s reputation). 
 91.  See generally Lawrence A. Cunningham, A New Legal Theory to Test Executive 
Pay:  Contractual Unconscionability, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1177, 1187 (2011) (“Divergence of 
interests between managers and shareholders can be reduced by:  (a) investing in 
monitoring devices, such as oversight, auditing, and internal controls . . . .”); Eugene 
F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 295–97 (1980) 
(discussing the extent to which market forces can discipline managers and prevent 
them from shirking). 
 92.  Carney, supra note 85, at 415–16 (recommending the use of incentives based 
on performance for corporate managers to align interests); Cunningham, supra note 
91, at 1187 (finding that compensation contracts are often an efficient way to reduce 
costs and align shareholder and manager interests).  
 93.  Carney, supra note 85, at 416. 
 94.  See Feldman et al., supra note 62, at 533 (contending that one way to 
incentivize best efforts is to frame payoffs as losses rather than gains). 
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incentivizing corporate managers with stock so that the agent is 
motivated to maximize the overall profitability of the firm.95 
A study of commercial outsourcing agreements confirmed that 
firms employ many of these mechanisms.96  Particularly in higher 
agency cost situations, firms are more likely to structure agreements 
with extensive financial incentives and control rights, considerable 
monitoring, and economic consequences linked to performance.97 
b. In government service contracting 
Applying general insights from agency theory to government 
service contracting seems to yield the conclusion that similar 
mechanisms would work well in this slightly different context.  
Indeed, the vast majority of economists and public law scholars 
addressing agency costs in government service contracting have taken 
a “complete” or “formalist” contracting perspective.  Following the 
assumption that agency costs arise because of asymmetric 
information, moral hazard, and shirking, they suggest that similar 
mechanisms may mitigate agency costs in other contexts.98  The most 
common suggestion for obtaining better quality service is to draft 
more specific contracts (in particular, to better specify tasks and 
performance metrics), include monitoring provisions, and tie agent 
performance to compensation.99  Public law scholars and economists 
who write on this topic largely agree as to this approach.100  As Nestor 
Davidson has put it, “Commentators concerned with capturing 
privatization’s benefits and muting its potential harms often call for 
additional government control of private providers through their 
contractual agreements, specifying in ever-more-careful terms the 
                                                          
 95.  Carney, supra note 85, at 416.  
 96.  George S. Geis, An Empirical Examination of Business Outsourcing Transactions, 
96 VA. L. REV. 241, 278 (2010) [hereinafter Geis, An Emprical Examination].   
 97.  See id. (concluding that a pattern of control and monitoring emerges where 
parties select “firm-like” provisions to govern incentives).   
 98.  See, e.g., Geis, Business Outsourcing, supra note 65, at 982–84 (stating that 
asymmetrical information is persistent and offering strategies to combat it). 
 99.  See, e.g., John Forrer et al., Public-Private Partnerships and the Public 
Accountability Question, 70 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 475, 478 (2010) (“The most common 
suggestion for obtaining better quality service is to draft more specific contracts with 
incentives that track to agent performance”). 
 100.  Freeman, supra note 77, at 1317, 1351 (“[T]here might be considerable 
agreement between the economic and public law views about the importance of clear 
and enforceable contractual terms to the success of privatization.”); see also Davidson, 
supra note 22, at 277 (noting commentators’ views that privatization is best 
approached through contracts that “are clear, thorough, accurate, and 
unambiguous” (quoting SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, 
supra note 51, at 188)). 
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scope of the engagement and monitoring providers with ever-
greater oversight.”101 
The logic is evident.  The government as the only buyer has 
substantial bargaining power.  It can, therefore, set the parameters of 
the relationship.  In addition to standard contract terms such as 
compensation and contract duration, some scholars encourage 
parties to specify tasks, outcome measures, and incentives or 
sanctions.102  By specifying tasks, the government defines the actions 
the vendor must undertake to ensure the service meets the 
government’s specifications.103  For example, a contract may specify 
how many times a vendor should meet with mental health patients.  
Outcome measures (performance-based criteria) dictate results that a 
vendor must accomplish, for instance, moving a designated 
percentage of people off of the welfare rolls.  Finally, monetary 
incentives or sanctions reward or penalize the vendor for either 
failing to meet or succeeding in meeting certain goals. 
In addition to specifying tasks, outcome measures, and incentives, 
governments are also encouraged to include reporting requirements 
and monitoring rights in their contracts.104  If the government utilizes 
these contractual control mechanisms it can, in theory, ensure 
compliance with program goals.  This is particularly true, so the 
                                                          
 101.  Davidson, supra note 22, at 263; see also Laura A. Dickinson, Public 
Values/Private Contract, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 14, at 335, 336, 338 
(arguing that performance metrics, monitoring, and enforcement mechanisms in 
international outsourcing contracts should be bolstered); JOHN REHFUSS, DESIGNING 
AN EFFECTIVE BIDDING AND MONITORING SYSTEM TO MINIMIZE PROBLEMS IN COMPETITIVE 
CONTRACTING 6–8 (1993), available at http://reason.org/files/ 
02e4e0b06250ddff83fe1732c011f696.pdf (arguing specificity of the contract, and in 
particular service specifications, is important for both the bidding process and the 
monitoring process); Savas, Privatization in State and Local Government, supra note 18, 
at 99; Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire:  Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the 
Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135, 172 
(2005); Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 22, at 170–71; Freeman, Extending 
Public Law Norms, supra note 77, at 1341; Minow, supra note 22, at 1267; Parkin, supra 
note 22, at 1348 (“[W]ithout contractual provisions that counteract incentives to cut 
recipients off the rolls, the post-1996 rise in privatization increases the risk that 
welfare benefits are erroneously terminated.”); Romzek & Johnston, supra note 18, at 
438 (arguing contract specificity of parties’ duties and obligations is important for 
accountability and proposing contracts that clearly articulate responsibilities); 
Stevenson, supra note 84, at 126–31 (arguing for more stringent contractual 
safeguards to protect welfare recipients); Kyle, supra note 68, at 2111–12 (suggesting 
a graduated bonus system tied to recidivism rates in private prisons); Beuve & 
Chever, supra note 14, at 3–4. 
 102.  Brown et al., Managing Public Service Contracts, supra note 22, at 327. 
 103.  Trevor L. Brown et al., Trust and Contract Completeness in the Public Sector, 33 
LOC. GOV.’T STUD. 607, 609 (2007). 
 104.  Brown et al., Managing Public Service Contracts, supra note 22, at 327–28. 
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argument goes, if it can adequately monitor the private service 
provider to observe compliance with performance metrics.105 
Although the next Section addresses some of the incomplete 
contracting literature, the extent to which there is majority scholarly 
agreement over use of formal contracting mechanisms in the 
privatization context cannot be overstated.106  For instance, Jody 
Freeman has advocated for “greater specificity of terms, graduated 
penalties, and oversight by a ‘contract manager’” in the nursing 
home context.107  Martha Minow has suggested:  “As drafter of the 
contracts, and the piper calling the tune, the government can set 
extensive and detailed public requirements.”108  Alexander “Sasha” 
Volokh states:  “there is no substitute for performance contracts that 
encourage quality improvements, effective monitoring, and information 
gathering and disclosure.”109  Writing about the privatization of 
foreign affairs functions, Laura Dickinson suggests “[c]ontracts could 
be drafted to explicitly extend relevant norms of public international 
law to private contractors, provide for enhanced oversight and 
enforcement, and include more specific terms . . . .”110 
2. Relational contracting 
Although detailed, incentive-based contracting is the most 
prevalent scholarly suggestion, other contracting approaches, namely 
relational contracting and contracting for innovation, are methods 
worth considering. 
Relational contracting is often considered the counterpoint to the 
traditional transaction contemplated in the prior Section.111  There is 
no universally adopted definition of relational contracting, but it 
generally refers to a scenario where the relationship between the 
parties takes center stage, not the language of the contract itself.112  
                                                          
 105.  Id. at 328; see also RUSSELL W. HINTON, COMPONENTS OF AN EFFECTIVE 
CONTRACT MONITORING SYSTEM 4 (2003), available at http://www.dca.ga.gov/ 
housing/housingdevelopment/BestPractices_ContractMonitoring.pdf (explaining that 
contract monitoring ensures adequate performance). 
 106.  See Freeman, supra note 77, at 1350–51 (arguing that “there might be 
considerable agreement between the economic and public law views about the 
importance of clear and enforceable contractual terms to the success of privatization”). 
 107.  Freeman, The Contracting State, supra note 22, at 202. 
 108.  MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS:  PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC 
GOOD 33 (2002). 
 109.  The Law of Prisons, supra note 22, at 1887.  
 110.  Laura Dickinson, Contract as a Tool for Regulating Private Military Companies, in 
FROM MERCENARIES TO MARKET:  THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY 
COMPANIES 217, 218 (Simon Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007). 
 111.  See supra Part II.C.1.  
 112.  Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. 
REV. 1089, 1090–91 (1981). 
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One view distinguishes traditional contract arrangements specified at 
the time of contracting from circumstances, usually involving long-
term contracts, where it is not feasible to draft a completely 
contingent contract at the time of entering into the transaction.113  In 
such a scenario, parties resort to broader standards to dictate 
behavior, such as “best efforts” clauses, or they find ways to solve 
agency costs through monitoring or bonding mechanisms (like 
unilateral termination clauses).114  But the touchstone of relational 
contracting is a focus on building trust through repeated or long-
term interactions.115 
There is also a broader view of relational contracting, where 
contracts are deemed “relational” when the parties act according to 
norms that do not exist in the written contract.116  In that view, the 
written contract itself might be very specific.  Nonetheless, it does not 
completely govern the parties’ relationship.  The focus is on the 
informal ways parties ignore the terms of the contract through 
conduct.117  Under the broader definition, every contract is relational 
to some extent. 
The second alternative to highly specified, formal, incentive-based 
contracting is “contract[ing] for innovation” through a process called 
braiding.118  Proponents of braiding argue that there is too much 
focus on formal contract mechanisms and informal contract 
mechanisms as distinct approaches.119  In practice, braiding advocates 
                                                          
 113.  Id. at 1091. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  See, e.g., Macneil, supra note 36, at 886–87.  But see Goetz & Scott, supra note 
112, at 1090–91 (stating that “temporal extension per se is not the defining 
characteristic” of relational contracts). 
 116.  See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:  Creating 
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1725 (2001) 
(using the cotton industry as a case study to consider the importance of external 
factors beyond the written contract that strengthen contractual relationships in 
industry); Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory:  Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. 
L. REV. 877, 877–78 (2000) (surveying the theory of relational contracts and defining 
“contract” as “relations in which exchange occurs,” rather than as specifically 
prescribed transactions); see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in 
Business:  A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 56, 62 (1963) (finding that, among 
a sampling of the manufacturing industry, the role of non-contractual practices in 
exchanges is often significant); Macneil, Contracts, supra note 36, at 888–89 (arguing 
against a neoclassical theory of contract law that mandates the entire contractual 
relation could or should be “encompassed in some original assent to it”).  
 117.  See, e.g., Shawn J. Bayern, Rational Ignorance, Rational Closed-Mindedness, and 
Modern Economic Formalism in Contract Law, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 945–46 (2009). 
 118.  Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 30, at 1382–83.  “Braiding” refers to the 
process of incorporating both formal and informal contracting to accommodate 
uncertainty and to foster mutual innovation between contracting parties.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 1388. 
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suggest there is often an intertwining of the two.120  Particularly where 
two parties enter into a transaction where the ultimate product or 
service cannot be specified because it is not yet determined, formal 
and informal terms must be weaved together.121  A contract for 
innovation will be formal in the sense that it defines a governance 
process122 and specifies formal mechanisms for sharing information, but 
it will be informal in terms of substantive performance requirements.123 
One challenge to the braiding concept is that experiments have 
found a crowding out effect against the backdrop of formal 
contracts.124  Braiding does still rely on formal contracts to some 
degree.125  There is speculation that the informal aspects of contracts 
for innovation will mitigate the effect of crowding out, but this theory 
has yet to be tested.126 
Braiding is essentially a specific application of relational 
contracting because its primary goals are to permit the parties to 
build trust and to enhance the likelihood of a successful long-term 
relationship through a focus on contract governance.127  But, while 
the idea of relational contracting dates back to the 1960s and 1970s 
with the seminal works of Stewart Macaulay and Ian Macneil, two of 
the preeminent scholars on relational contract theory, the primary 
focus in government service contracting remains on the classical, 
formal approach.128 
D. Current Practice Likely Matches Theory:  Writing Detailed Contracts 
with Monitoring 
There has been far too little study of the actual content of 
government service contracts.  However, it is widely believed that 
detailed and incentive-based contracting is the most utilized model in 
                                                          
 120.  Id. at 1388–89. 
 121.  Id. at 1383. 
 122.  Id. at 1384 (suggesting that formal contracts are utilized for “exchanging 
information about the progress and prospects of their joint activities” where such 
information exchanges “provide the foundation for raising the existing level of trust”). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  See id. at 1381 n.6 (cataloging studies that have shown the crowding out 
effect under formal contracting). 
 125.  Id. at 1382 (noting that parties “are responding to rising uncertainty” by “writ[ing] 
contracts that intertwine elements of formal and informal contracting” mechanisms). 
 126.  Id. at 1386 (“We argue that the endogeneity of the informal mechanisms in 
the contract—i.e., that they are largely created by the information exchange 
established in the formal contract—may well eliminate the risk of crowding out.”). 
 127.  Id. at 1386–87. 
 128.  Supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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practice.129  Further, government contracts are generally understood 
to be even more detailed than entirely commercial counterparts.130  
Limited studies confirm these intuitions, but there is much room for 
additional work in this area.131 
It is, however, relatively easy to locate examples of detailed, 
incentive-based contracts in government service contracting.  For 
instance, when Indiana contracted out to IBM to administer public 
benefits for the state, the contract “contain[ed] more than 160 pages 
plus extensive attachments, including 10 exhibits, 24 schedules, and 
10 appendices, encompassing all aspects of the parties’ working 
relationship.”132  In substance, there were a wide variety of control 
mechanisms, including detailed performance metrics and 
performance-based compensation.133 
In addition, studies of outsourcing in the analogous commercial 
context have confirmed that in higher agency cost situations, 
principals try to exert more control over their agents through 
contract mechanisms like detailed task specification and monitoring.134  
The government contracting context is likely to be similar. 
Although better agent control is the primary motivating factor 
behind detailed contracting, there are additional reasons for parties 
to prefer detailed contracting.  For instance, a detailed contract may 
insulate a government agent from fallout if the service provision is 
                                                          
 129.  See, e.g., Parkin, supra note 22, at 1346 (discussing the prevalence of welfare 
privatization contracts that contain performance-based incentive compensation 
despite limited efficacy). 
 130.  See, e.g., Mary K. Marvel & Howard P. Marvel, The Ratio of Beef Cubes to Onion 
(6:1) in Hungarian Goulash and Public Sector Contracting:  Market-Like or Market-Lite?, 
POL’Y CURRENTS, Summer 2003, at 2, 2 (noting that the nature of public sector 
contracts may “vary systematically” from that of commercial contracts in terms of 
complexity and specificity); Praxis Solutions, Inc., supra note 25, at 4. 
 131.  See Jérôme Barthélemy & Bertrand V. Quélin, Complexity of Outsourcing 
Contracts and Ex Post Transaction Costs:  An Empirical Investigation, 43 J. MGMT. STUD. 
1775, 1776 (2006) (analyzing a number of outsourcing contracts to compare 
contract complexity against ex post transactional costs); Dickinson, Government for 
Hire, supra note 101, at 142–43, 171 (describing the privatization of governmental 
functions in the international context and suggesting that more highly specified 
contracting could bring oversight and accountability); Marvel & Marvel, supra note 
130, at 2–3 (comparing food vendor contracts for public and private entities and 
finding that government contracts tend to be more specified than commercial 
contracts for the same services); Romzek & Johnston, supra note 18, at 436–37 (2005) 
(assessing state social service contracts in Kansas to determine the factors that 
increase contract accountability). 
 132.  Indiana v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 49D10-1005-PL-021451, slip op. at 9 
(Ind. Super. Ct. July 18, 2012). 
 133.  Id. at 15–17.   
 134.  See Blair et al., supra note 82, at 293–94 (discussing specification of terms and 
procedures in the context of analyzing law firm outsourcing contracts); Geis, An 
Empirical Examination, supra note 96, at 271–72 (quantifying offshore business 
outsourcing contracts to gauge, among other factors, control features).  
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ultimately poor.135  In other words, the government actor could argue 
that he or she wrote a “good” contract and, therefore, should not be 
blamed for contractor errors.  With pressure to enhance public 
accountability, detailed contracting provides some insulation for the 
drafter and a possible reduction in risk. 
Economically rational outside legal counsel (for both sides) likely 
also prefer drafting detailed contracts for similar reasons, but also 
because the cost of drafting thorough contracts ex ante is likely to be 
higher, leading to higher compensation for the lawyer (assuming 
hourly-based or complexity-based payment structures).136  A large 
part of the role of the lawyer in contract drafting is to anticipate 
potential problems ex post.  There is pressure to be as detailed and 
specific as possible not only to set expectations for contractor 
behavior, but also to have contractual language to point to if 
litigation later materializes.137 
The private provider might also prefer more detail.  With a better 
sense of exactly what is required, the contractor can more accurately 
bid on its services.  The contractor can also make a better case that it 
successfully completed work when what counts as “success” was clear 
from the contract ex ante.  A contractor might argue that it needs to 
know what the government has hired it to do. 
All are potentially valid reasons to prefer detailed contracts that 
highly specify tasks.  However, the next Part discusses why such detailed 
contracts often do not work in complex government service contracting. 
II. THE CURRENT APPROACH OFTEN FAILS 
Despite the relative unanimity of theory and the intuitive appeal of 
the detailed contracting approach, there are many problems with the 
approach in practice, particularly for certain types of government 
service contracts.  In prior work, I defined a category of government 
service contracts with high agency costs.138  I argued in particular that 
where a service is difficult to specify and monitor, the market for 
private providers is thin, and service recipients amount to a narrow, 
disenfranchised segment of the population, we tend to see contracts 
that are biased to result in cost savings at the sacrifice of service 
                                                          
 135.  See Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2242  (noting that outsourcing 
permits the government to “point its finger at the private entity”). 
 136.  Wendy Netter Epstein, Facilitating Incomplete Contracts, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 3) (on file with author) (discussing the 
sociolegal deterrents to incomplete contracting). 
 137.  Id. at 29. 
 138.  Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2215–16. 
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quality.139  This is because the government lacks adequate incentive to 
procure good quality service and lacks the tools to obtain such service 
from its private agent.140  I conceived of low quality service as a 
negative externality imposed on service recipients that the transacting 
parties were not forced to internalize.141  Because of the very 
characteristics that bias contracts to result in negative externalities, I 
suggest in this Section that the traditional methods for mitigating 
agency costs tend not to be effective. 
Government service can be conceived of as existing on a three-
dimensional spectrum, where the axes are ease of specification and 
monitoring, extent of market competition, and portion of the 
population affected by the service.  In one quadrant are outsourcing 
contracts that are more likely to succeed at reducing cost while 
improving service quality.  The public management literature 
describes such contracts as those for “hard services.”142  Hard services 
are easy to specify and monitor.143  Typically, there is a competitive 
market for providers of hard services.144  And they are easy to specify 
and monitor and affect a large portion of the population.  
Conventional examples include garbage collection and road repair.145 
Traditional mechanisms for controlling agency costs are likely to 
work relatively well for these services.146  For instance, using the 
garbage collection example, it is easy to specify what the government 
seeks—a contractor to collect and dispose of trash at all residences 
and businesses in a community pursuant to a schedule.  If the 
contractor fails in this task, it will be obvious.  Residents and business 
owners will see their trash not being collected and will complain.  
Their complaints will be heard and will effect change because the 
whole community is affected and collectively has political power.  The 
contractor will heed these complaints and remedy any performance not 
in keeping with the requirements of its detailed contract or else risk 
being replaced by another contractor available in the marketplace. 
                                                          
 139.  Id. at 2216. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Other scholars have described this category of contracts as one that simply 
should not be outsourced at all.  See, e.g., Donahue, The Transformation of Government Work, 
supra note 14, at 49 (listing three criteria that should be present before a government 
function may be “split off[:]  specificity, ease of evaluation, and competition”). 
 142.  Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2218–19. 
 143.  Id. at 2219. 
 144.  Id. at 2219–20 & n.37. 
 145.  Id. at 2219.  It happens that typically, hard government services also affect a wide 
segment of the population and tend to have a competitive market for providers.  Id.  
 146.  Id. at 2219–20 & n.37. 
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Knowing of these potential consequences will cause the provider to 
refrain from opportunistic actions.  A garbage collector is not likely 
to shirk when faced with a contract that specifies tasks because it 
knows the government has switching options if service quality is poor.  
And it knows that the government will likely discover when service 
quality is poor because even if the government does a poor job 
monitoring, the market will convey performance information.  In 
short, the traditional detailed contracting method is likely to work 
well against the backdrop of hard contracts.147 
On the other end of the three-dimensional spectrum are “soft 
services,”148 where the traditional detailed contracting is likely to work 
much less well.  In soft services, people are typically the service-focus, 
and there is more difficulty defining, measuring, and monitoring 
execution.149  Soft services have been termed “complex human 
services” and usually involve significant discretion on the part of the 
service provider.150  Examples include running prisons and 
administering welfare benefits.151  These services also happen to 
involve small, disenfranchised portions of the population. 
One might argue, and several have, that soft services simply should 
not be outsourced.152  There might be merit in that argument.  
Nonetheless, the reality is that this category of service is subject to 
increased government outsourcing,153 and there is little reason to 
believe that the trend will reverse.  As such, this Article focuses on how 
contracting mechanisms might obviate the most common problems. 
                                                          
 147.  Beuve & Chever, supra note 14, at 2–6 (citing quantitative studies showing 
that outsourcing contracts—for hard services such as cleaning and garbage 
collection—actually “allows to reduce cost” but “at the expense of quality”).  Also, 
relatively speaking, not much innovation is required in such contexts. 
 148.  Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2218–19. 
 149.  Id. at 2219. This dichotomy of course is overly simplistic because few services 
fall clearly into one category or the other.  It is more accurate to conceive of services 
existing somewhere along a three-dimensional spectrum. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id.  It happens that many soft services impact narrow, disenfranchised 
segments of the population, and markets for providers are thin.  Id. at 2219–20. 
 152.  Eduardo Porter, When Public Outperforms Private in Services, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 15, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/16/business/when-privatization-works-and- 
why-it-doesnt-always.html?_r=0 (proposing that the private sector will be better-suited 
than the public sector to perform a given task when “the task is clear-cut and it’s 
possible to define concrete goals and reward those who meet them” and the parties 
can “‘rule out cream-skimming and can ensure the measure is not gamed,’” as 
opposed to tasks in contracts with “complex and diffuse” objectives that “mak[e] it 
difficult to align profit with goals,” which are less suitable for privatization). 
 153.  Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2213 (“[S]tate governments’ use of 
privatization is on the rise.”). 
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A. Task Specification Is Ineffective and Costly 
The first tenet of the traditional method for mitigating agency costs 
is task specification.154  By definition, for the universe of contracts 
contemplated in this Article, there are difficulties in defining tasks or 
in clearly defining outcomes that are measurable and subject to 
monitoring or reporting. 
For many complex services, it can be difficult to “‘writ[e] clear 
contracts with specific goals against which contractors can be held 
accountable.’”155  While it may be easy to specify what it means to be 
an effective pot-hole filler, consider how difficult it is to specify what 
it means to run a good prison or what it means to do a good job 
investigating files for purposes of security clearance decisions.156  If it 
is difficult to clearly specify tasks or outcome measures, it follows that 
task specification will not work well to constrain agency costs.157  Take 
the theoretical example of the government hiring a private agency to 
conduct foreign affairs.  It would be nearly impossible to specify in 
advance the exact requirements of the private firm.  The government 
could not even predict ex ante what issues might arise.158  Any 
attempt to highly specify tasks would necessarily be incomplete. 
Focusing on outcomes can similarly be problematic because the 
methods used to obtain the outcomes might not be desirable.  For 
instance, in the welfare-to-work context, setting a goal of returning 
more applicants to work resulted in profit-seekers “creaming” 
applications—selecting those who are easier to serve or more likely to 
be successful, and avoiding the harder cases.159 
When the U.S. government outsourced security clearance 
processes to USIS, the impetus for the decision was the backlog in 
applications.160  The contract, therefore, focused on rewarding the 
timely processing of the applications.161  It now seems obvious that 
                                                          
 154.  Cf. id. at 2234. 
 155.  Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized Welfare, 89 
CALIF. L. REV. 569, 600 (2001) (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-98-
6, SOCIAL SERVICE PRIVATIZATION:  EXPANSION POSES CHALLENGES IN ENSURING 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PROGRAM RESULTS 14 (1997)). 
 156.  It may seem that the federal government just wrote a poor contract for USIS 
and perhaps that is the case.  But even outcome-based contracts are criticized for 
failure to prompt consummate performance. 
 157.  On the other hand, the traditional method will often work well for more 
discrete tasks.  For instance, one could easily imagine a contract for road repair that 
awards the filling of a certain number of potholes within a certain time period.   
 158.  Shapiro, supra note 79, at 417–18 (noting that specifying tasks in advance is 
particularly challenging where, as with many enforcement issues in foreign affairs, 
the “resolution . . . inevitably involves a discretionary judgment”). 
 159.  Epstein, Contract Theory, supra note 13, at 2249, 2253. 
 160.  Gabriel, Shortcuts, supra note 8. 
 161.  Id. 
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the contract incentives (completing the processing of applications 
over thoroughly investigating backgrounds) were the wrong ones, but 
often it is difficult to create performance-incentives because of 
incompatible goals (in the case of USIS, speed versus thoroughness).  
Whereas one instinct might be that the USIS example is just one of a 
poorly designed contract, almost any other outcome or performance-
focused alternative has significant problems. 
Outsourcing education can be similarly troubling in this regard.  In 
the context of education, one might also specify desired outcomes 
rather than tasks; for instance, one might state that students are to 
achieve particularized scores on standardized tests.162  Specifying 
desired outcomes, however, only incentivizes teaching to the test 
instead of encouraging good teaching.163  The distinction between 
perfunctory and consummate behavior comes back into the analysis 
here.  Accordingly, it is difficult to force compliance with overall 
service provision goals solely through more detailed requirements or 
even outcome-based rewards.164 
Even if it is possible to specify either tasks or outcomes, the best 
possible outcome for the principal is to get just what it requested.  
Extreme specification kills the very innovation that contracting out 
was supposed to enable.  In other words, privatization theory suggests 
that private service providers not constrained by government 
bureaucracy are more likely to innovate to provide better quality 
service at lower cost.  In practice, however, the intense specification 
of tasks in incentive contracts vastly reduces the space in which 
providers are left to innovate. 
If a highly specific contract defines tasks that must be completed, 
the best case scenario is that agents will comply.  “The more we 
reward those things that we can measure, and not reward the things 
we care about but don’t measure, the more we will distort 
behavior.”165  Put another way, “‘[i]f what gets measured is what gets 
managed, then what gets managed is what gets done.’”166 
                                                          
 162.  JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION:  PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE 
MEANS 219 (1989). 
 163.  See Porter, supra note 152 (“Unsupervised apple pickers who are paid by the 
apple will probably pick them off the ground.”). 
 164.   See, e.g., Wisconsin Works (W-2) Contract and Implementation (C&I) 
Committee, Meeting Minutes 1 (July 18, 2008), available at http://dcf.wisconsin.gov/ 
w2/ci/2008/pdf/07_08/july_08_ci_final_notes.pdf (specifying issues that state 
agencies in Wisconsin expressed with regard to the disconnect between performance 
standards and “overarching goals”). 
 165.  Porter, supra note 152. 
 166.  Id. 
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Finally, highly specifying contracts carries with it a large cost.  In a 
bid situation, the government contracting agents spend many hours 
specifying the terms of the bid up front.  In a negotiated contract 
scenario, both parties may negotiate the terms of the deal over a 
lengthy period.  The traditional argument is that this ex ante cost is 
justified (or at least may be justified) to prevent the ex post cost of 
litigation.  Nevertheless, if the intense specification does not actually 
produce better results by means of better agent performance, as I 
argue, then the cost incurred in specification is actually decreasing 
the net gain for the parties. 
Accordingly, although task specification is supposed to deter 
opportunistic behavior on the part of the agent, for complex services, 
specification is not likely to have the desired effect.167 
B. Monitoring Is Both Difficult and Expensive to Conduct 
A related problem is that it is both difficult and costly to monitor 
complex government services.  Monitoring theoretically mitigates 
agency costs by constraining a contractor’s opportunity to shirk.168  In 
practice, however, the efficient use of monitoring depends on the 
precision with which the government defines the tasks and the 
observability of relevant behavior.169 
Monitoring is also costly, and with increased monitoring difficulty 
comes increased cost.  Monitoring is particularly difficult for soft 
government services that are large, complicated, and removed from 
the public eye.170  While government officials can make unannounced 
visits to private prisons, it would be difficult to adequately observe the 
                                                          
 167.  Shapiro, supra note 79, at 417 (“The literature on outsourcing government 
services recognizes . . . that it is easier to contract for government services in cases 
where the parameters of a vendor’s performance can be clearly specified in 
advance.”).  In her work, Shapiro compares the relative ease of contracting for 
garbage pickup against the more difficult prospect of contracting for private prisons, 
noting that “the former function does not require discretionary judgments by private 
employees in circumstances in which it is difficult to specify in advance how the 
employees should act.”  Id. 
 168.  See Trevor L. Brown & Matthew Potoski, Transaction Costs and Contracting:  
The Practitioner Perspective, 28 PUB. PERFORMANCE & MGMT. REV. 326, 328, 330 (2005). 
 169.  See id. at 330. 
 170.  See id. at 332 (explaining that government services with low asset specificity, 
or a high likelihood that the resources applied to delivering the service can be 
applied to other services, are easier to monitor because the services can be 
performed by a greater number of potential vendors and the services can be easily 
measured and directly observed).  
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goings on at entire institutions.  Monitoring also requires expertise, 
which government officials often lack.171 
Many studies have found that governments under-monitor when 
they outsource complex services.172  This may have to do with the 
difficulty of monitoring when tasks are not adequately specified, the 
cost involved in effectively monitoring, or the imprecision in 
monitoring.  For instance, one study of local government outsourcing 
conducted in 2007 found that 58% of the sample “questioned the 
validity of the information obtained from monitoring.”173 
The accuracy of the data was questioned primarily because quality 
assessments are based on infrequent visits (18%) and evaluations 
are made based on snapshot depictions (40%) of on-site conditions 
that are susceptible to manipulation by providers (i.e., this 
response reflects concern that conditions on-site are “staged” for 
visits by monitors).174 
Other studies have found similar results.175 
As with task specification, monitoring is not likely to have the 
desired effect of constraining agency costs. 
C. Thin Market Does Not Constrain Opportunism 
The absence of a well-functioning market provides an additional 
challenge to the function of the traditional contract approach.  The 
traditional method assumes that an agent will be dissuaded from 
performing poorly because the principal will know what amounts to 
poor performance, will become aware of poor performance, and will 
have switching options in the marketplace.  An agent who wants to 
avoid losing the contract at renewal, or who is concerned about 
reputational consequences of poor performance, will make every 
effort to perform well.  A well-functioning market is integral to the 
success of the traditional approach because without true switching 
                                                          
 171.  See Richard Frankel, Regulating Privatized Government Through § 1983, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1499 (2009) (alluding to the government’s lack of expertise by 
pointing out that it often monitors the easiest measurement available, which is cost). 
 172.  See Mildred E. Warner et al., Contracting Back In:  When Privatization Fails, in THE 
MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 2003 30, 36 (2003) (noting that in a survey most of the respondents 
reported some level of contracting out but fewer than half reported any monitoring). 
 173.  Dicke, supra note 22, at 460.  
 174.  Id.   
 175.  In one study, fewer than half of the responding municipal governments 
reported doing any monitoring.  Mildred E. Warner & Amir Hefetz, Cooperative 
Competition:  Alternative Service Delivery, 2002–2007, in THE MUNICIPAL YEAR BOOK 2009 
11, 14, 18  (2009) (reporting private entities responsible for more than 25% of local 
or municipal service delivery); see also Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private 
Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 491 (2005) (describing a December 1997 survey of state and 
federal government agencies reporting that almost 30% did no monitoring at all). 
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options in the marketplace, the agent would not be dissuaded from 
acting opportunistically because the agent would not fear losing the 
contract at renewal or general reputational sanctions. 
This precondition of a well-functioning market, however, 
oftentimes does not exist.  In one instance in New Jersey, there was 
only one bidder for a contract to run a 450-bed immigrant detention 
center.176  The list of outsourcing contracts entered into after a single 
bid, or a low number of bids, is a long one.177  Studies have also 
confirmed the anecdotal evidence of thin markets for certain types of 
government services.178 
There may be many reasons for thin markets.  Sometimes the 
government contracts out for services that did not previously exist.179  
While markets may develop, for instance for private prisons, only 
resource-rich companies are likely to be able to compete.180  Even so, 
once a provider wins the initial contract, it gains an advantage that 
may be hard for other companies to overcome.  For this reason, there 
tends to be consolidation of firms in specified markets for 
government services over time.181 
Whereas effective markets can help overcome principal-agent 
problems, public-private contracting markets are thin.  For this 
reason, as well, traditional methods of specifying tasks, monitoring, 
                                                          
 176.  Sam Dolnick, Reversing Course, Officials in New Jersey Cancel One-Bid Immigrant 
Jail Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/16/ 
nyregion/essex-county-reverses-decision-on-detention-center-bid.html. 
 177.  For example, in Connecticut, Colonial Cooperative Care, Inc. was the only 
bidder for its contract to determine eligibility for disability-based cash assistance.  See 
generally Stevenson, supra note 84, at 91, 105. 
 178.  For instance, a 2007 survey of city and municipal governments found that, 
on average, there are fewer than two provider options for city service contracts.  See 
Warner & Hefetz, supra note 175, at 11, 17.  State governments also experience thin 
markets as they increase their reliance on contracts for service delivery.  For a good 
summary of studies competition in local and state-level outsourcing, see Jocelyn M. 
Johnston & Barbara S. Romzek, Social Welfare Contracts as Networks:  The Impact of 
Network Stability on Management and Performance, 40 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 115, 141 (2008) 
(providing an example from Kansas, where a few primary contractors have 
dominated and shifted negotiating power away from the state purchaser); Van Slyke, 
Mythology of Privatization, supra note 14, at 299 (providing a summary of studies 
regarding competition in local and state-level outsourcing); Mildred E. Warner & 
Germà Bel, Competition or Monopoly?  Comparing Privatization of Local Public Services in 
the US and Spain, 86 PUB. ADMIN. 723, 725 (2008) (explaining the concentration of 
private contractors in the waste industry).  
 179.  In reality, governments often buy a wide range of goods and services for 
which there is no preexisting market so there are only a limited number of suppliers. 
 180.   Stevenson, supra note 84, at 91. 
 181.  See Bach, supra note 71, at 299 n.100 (stating that over time vendors tend to 
become established as the providers for a particular program); Mark Schlesinger et 
al., Competitive Bidding and States’ Purchase of Services:  The Case of Mental Health Care in 
Massachusetts, 5 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 245, 253 (1986) (describing the multiple 
forces encouraging consolidation among contractors for mental health services in 
Massachusetts—forces such as economies of scale in both provisioning and bidding).  
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and tying performance to compensation often do not adequately 
constrain opportunistic behavior or, even better, prompt best efforts.182 
D. Risk of Corruption 
The traditional model does little to account for the risk of 
corruption, which is particularly high in the world of government 
service contracting.  As myriad examples indicate, the companies that 
receive lucrative contracts may do so on the basis of political or 
economic connections, rather than merit. 
For instance, in Pennsylvania, two judges received $2.6 million over 
seven years from Pennsylvania Child Care LLC, a private company 
that operated a juvenile detention center, in return for helping to 
secure the company a twenty-year, $58 million contract with the 
county.183  The judges were charged with aggressively sentencing 
children for minor infractions to ensure that the detention center 
remained at capacity.184  In early 2009, the two judges were charged 
with racketeering, extortion, bribery, money laundering, and fraud, 
among other crimes.185  Also in 2009, a county commission president 
in Alabama was convicted of taking bribes to steer government 
business to J.P. Morgan.186 
Simply put, corruption may also blunt the impact of actions meant 
to control agency costs.187  A party that knows it will win a contract 
renewal on the basis of bribes rather than performance will not be 
incentivized to deliver better performance.188 
E.  Studies Demonstrate Problems with Traditional Approach 
Theory aside, some preliminary empirical studies have now shown 
that in certain types of public-private contracting, highly detailed and 
specific contractual requirements do not positively correlate with 
                                                          
 182.  See Schlesinger et al., supra note 181, at 253 (explaining that the difficulty in 
prespecifying a task, such as mental health care, lessens the incentive to perform as 
required, i.e., to produce more efficient care). 
 183.  Pennsylvania “Kids for Cash” Conspiracy, IN PUB. INT., http://www.inthepublic 
interest.org/case/pennsylvania-kids-cash-conspiracy (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 184.  Stephanie Chen, Pennsylvania Rocked by “Jailing Kids for Cash” Scandal, CNN 
(Feb. 24, 2009, 10:14 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/02/23/ 
pennsylvania.corrupt.judges. 
 185.  Id.  
 186.  Mary Williams Walsh, J.P. Morgan Settles Alabama Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/05/business/05derivatives.html. 
 187.  In part for this reason, sanctions are used infrequently and inconsistently. 
 188.   It is unclear whether drafting less detailed contracts more effectively curbs 
corruption.  This is an area requiring more study. 
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better contractor performance.189  For instance, one study was 
conducted on a dataset of 450 local government contracts from 
throughout the country obtained by a mail survey.190  It noted that 
there is a common set of variables in the literature thought to 
determine contract performance.191  Included in those variables are 
contract specificity and contract monitoring scope and intensity, 
among others.192  The study author hypothesized that these variables 
would be positively correlated with the dependent variable.193  On the 
contrary, though, the study found that “developing highly detailed 
and specific contractual requirements [to] have little if any effect on 
contracting performance,” and that “the discovery of performance 
problems through monitoring by itself does little to improve 
contracting performance.”194  It also found that the use of legal 
sanctions did not discourage poor performance.195  Nor did 
“including financial incentives . . . in the contractual agreement 
appear[] to have . . . [an] effect on contracting performance . . . .”196 
More work in this area is merited.  But, at the very least, there is 
strong reason to doubt that the default approach specifying tasks in 
detail, monitoring to ensure compliance, and tying success to 
financial incentives—is the best approach.  The next Part details an 
alternative suggested by work in behavioral economics. 
III.  SUGGESTING A DIFFERENT APPROACH 
The standard approach to principal-agent problems is predicated 
on the assumption of fully rational and selfish individuals looking for 
opportunities to shirk.197  Viewed in this way, agents need to be 
controlled or need to be given incentives so that their rational, profit-
                                                          
 189.  Sergio Fernandez, Accounting for Performance in Contracting for Services:  
Are Successful Contractual Relationships Controlled or Managed? 10–11 (Sept. 
2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://localgov.fsu.edu/ 
readings_papers/Service%20Delivery/Fernandez_Accounting_for_Performance_in_C
ontracting_Services.doc. 
 190.  Id. at 14–15. 
 191.  Id. at 6. 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. at 17–18. 
 195.  Id. at 18. 
 196.  Id. at 19; see also Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psychological Foundations of 
Incentives 1 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 507, 2002), available at 
http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/21434/1/dp507.pdf (finding that monetary 
incentives can “backfire and reduce the performance of agents or their compliance 
with rules”).  As discussed in Part III.B infra, other studies have affirmatively shown a 
negative effect from the use of incentives. 
 197.   See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing how agency theory assumes that agents are 
rational, selfish actors). 
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maximizing interests align with the principal’s interests.  But this is 
not necessarily always an accurate view of individual behavior.  
Indeed, it has now been over thirty years since Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky,198 Richard Thaler,199 and others first described a 
variety of contract-relevant behavioral anomalies. 
In particular, the positive reciprocity norm—meaning that people 
reward kind actions—has been shown to often constrain actors’ 
behavior, resulting in deviations from what the rational actor model 
would predict.200  Research has demonstrated that because of the 
inclination towards reciprocity, less complete contracts that do not 
highly specify tasks or do not use incentive-based compensation 
actually induce higher agent effort levels and better constrain 
opportunistic impulses than more explicit contracts.201  Therefore, 
exclusive reliance on the rational actor model in designing contracts 
to mitigate agency costs may be misplaced.  This Part suggests that 
particularly where traditional detailed contracts are ineffective, 
governments should instead consider drafting contracts that trade on 
the positive reciprocity value, and are accordingly less-detailed.202 
                                                          
 198.  See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory:  An Analysis of 
Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979) (presenting problems in which 
preferences violate the expected outcome); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The 
Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453 (1981) (finding shifts 
of preferences from the predicted outcome when the problem is framed in a 
different way). 
 199.  See Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 57–58 (1980) (arguing that in certain situations consumers act in 
a way inconsistent with economic theory). 
 200.  See, e.g., Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 164, 176–
77.  Not all actors will behave reciprocally.  Fehr et al. have found that 60–75% of 
subjects will behave reciprocally, while 15–25% of subjects will act in line with the 
rational actor model.  Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device, supra note 
28, at 840 n.7. 
 201.  See Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 173 (explaining 
that with incomplete contracts, workers can punish the employer by working less 
until the worker receives a wage increase). 
 202.  But see, Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Incomplete Contracts in a 
Complete Contract World, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 725, 732 n.17 (2006) (pointing out that 
vertical integration is often the suggested solution when more complete contracting 
is not possible).  However, for a variety of reasons both economic and political, 
governments often cannot practically take these services back “in-house.”  
Governments may lack the resources and expertise to directly provide these services.  
Once a service has been outsourced, there may be political consequences to 
admitting the fault in that decision.  Accordingly, this section looks for solutions 
aside from vertical integration. 
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A. The Reciprocity Norm in General 
Reciprocity in the behavioral economics literature203 refers to 
responding in kind.  If you are treated kindly, you will respond with 
kind actions.  If you are treated poorly, you will reciprocate with 
negative actions.  Reciprocity is different from “cooperative” or 
“retaliatory” behavior because it does not turn on a calculus as to 
future benefits.  As such, it is different from relational principals that 
largely focus on the development of trust through long-term 
interactions.  The games that define the parameters of reciprocal 
behavior are generally one-shot games with no repeat interaction.204  A 
reciprocal actor reacts without expectation of future material gains.205 
There are three seminal social dilemma games that are particularly 
relevant to the theory of reciprocity:  the Ultimatum Game, the Trust 
Game, and the Public Goods Game.206  The Ultimatum Game 
requires two participants to decide how to split a fixed sum of 
money.207  The first party makes a proposal of how to split the sum, 
and the second party either accepts the proposal or rejects it.  If the 
second party accepts the proposal, each leaves with their portion of 
the total.  If the second party rejects the proposal, both parties walk 
away with nothing.  If the parties acted in a purely rational, self-
interested manner, one would predict that the first party should 
make a very low offer and the second party should accept it.  The 
second party is better off walking away with any amount that is not 
zero.  The evidence shows, however, that if the first party proposes 
anything less than 20% of the total amount, the second party will 
reject the offer more than 50% of the time.208  In other words, people 
react to the perceived fairness of the offer, and not as the rational 
actor model would predict.209 
                                                          
 203.  The term reciprocity is used across many different disciplines.  Here, I am 
focused on reciprocity in the behavioral sense as a form of voluntary cooperation. 
 204.  Scott, supra note 28, at 1665.  This is important for the application of 
reciprocity to government service contracting where markets are often thin.  While 
trust that develops over time may certainly be important in this context, and many 
contracts may indeed be long-term and involve repeat interaction, I am concerned 
that repeat interaction games count on reputational sanctions in a well-functioning 
market to constrain bad behavior. 
 205.  Reciprocity is also different from altruism, which is unconditional kindness 
unrelated to others’ actions. 
 206.  Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll:  What Jambands Can Teach Us 
About Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 700 (2006). 
 207.  Id. at 706–07.  
 208.  Scott, supra note 28, at 1663. 
 209.  See id. at 1664 (explaining that responders do not behave as the self-
interested hypothesis predicts because “[t]hey are prepared to reject offers they 
perceive as unfair even at a cost to themselves”).   
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The Trust Game is an extension of the classical Dictator Game.210  
In the Trust Game, one player (the allocator) decides on his or her 
own how to split up a pot of money with a second player.211  The 
amount the allocator gives to the recipient is then multiplied by some 
value greater than one and the recipient chooses what amount, if any, 
to give back to the allocator.  The game is played only once.  A 
rational allocator will assign no part of the pot to the recipient, and a 
rational recipient will make no payment back to the allocator.212  A 
2009 meta-analysis of 84 trust game studies revealed that the allocator 
gave an average of about 51% and that the receiver returned an 
average of 37%.213 
Finally, in the Public Goods Game, each player is asked to secretly 
contribute some amount of their money into a public pot.214  The 
total amount of money is then multiplied by some “payoff” number 
(i.e., a multiplier) and divided equally among the group.  Subjects 
are allowed to keep the money they do not contribute.  Self-
interested, rational actors would contribute nothing to the pot 
because they free ride off of others’ contributions regardless of 
whether they individually contribute.  In reality, though, people do 
tend to contribute to the pot at some non-negligible percentage.  
Studies confirm that three-quarters of participants will contribute and 
that half of those who do so understand that they would be 
economically better off not contributing.215 
A host of empirical studies of real-world behavior have also 
confirmed the functioning of the reciprocity value in practice.  For 
instance, the decisions to give to charity, to not litter, and to wait your 
turn in line have all been studied as examples of reciprocity in 
action.216  In other words, people reciprocate the dispositions of 
                                                          
 210.  Id. at 1663 n.95; see Schultz, supra note 206, at 708 (explaining that, in the 
Dictator Game, the proposer decides how much money to give to an anonymous 
person, who receives the money and cannot respond). 
 211.  Noel D. Johnson & Alexandra Mislin, Cultures of Kindness:  A Meta-Analysis of 
Trust Game Experiments 4 (May 18, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Cultures-of-Kindness---A-Meta-Analysis-of-
Trust-Game-Experiments-.pdf.  
 212.  See Scott, supra note 28, at 1661 (defining rational choice theory as a theory 
that assumes individuals will make decisions based on self-interest). 
 213.   Johnson & Mislin, supra note 211, at 10–11, 40 tbl.1.  
 214.  Schultz, supra note 206, at 702–03. 
 215.  Brian Netter, Avoiding the Shameful Backlash:  Social Repercussions for the 
Increased Use of Alternative Sanctions, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 204  (2005).  In 
a 2001 study, Fischbacher et al., observed average contributions of 33.5%.  Urs 
Fischbacher et al., Are People Conditionally Cooperative?  Evidence from a Public Goods 
Experiment, 71 ECON. LETTERS 397, 401 (2001). 
 216.  See ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 29  (7th ed. 1995) (discussing how 
people tend to do what they see others doing and comply with social norms, for 
instance in not littering); ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE:  SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 96–
EPSTEIN.PAGEPROOF (DO NOT DELETE) 12/9/2014  2:43 PM 
38 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:1 
others; they engage in certain behavior because others are also 
willing to do so, and it seems fair to comply with behavioral norms. 
The games and their real-world counterparts demonstrate 
reciprocal social behavior that deviates from rational actor 
expectations.  The games focus on how behavior is affected in light of 
the perceived intentions of other actors.  If another actor treats you 
fairly, you are more likely to treat him or her fairly in return.  The 
actual fairness of distribution is not as relevant as the perceived 
kindness or fairness of actions.217 
The identification of the reciprocity norm may suggest that 
contracting mechanisms relying purely on material self-interest are 
incomplete because they are missing important behavioral 
motivations.  The next Section explores whether contract design has 
the potential to prompt reciprocal behavior. 
B. Reciprocity and Specificity in Contracting 
Reciprocity is now firmly established in experimental settings and 
can be reliably elicited.218  The next question, then, is how the 
reciprocity norm manifests in the contracting context (if at all). 
As discussed in Part II.E, one might predict that a less specified 
contract that does not tie performance to compensation would make 
it more difficult for a principal to control an agent.  If contracts are 
not well specified, then rational, self-interested parties might take 
advantage of ambiguities in the contract and shirk.  In addition, the 
traditional view of specificity in contract design is that specificity is an 
enabling factor for monitoring.  The agent cannot be successful in 
implementing the will of the principal unless it knows precisely what 
the principal wants it to do.  It is generally thought that specifying 
                                                          
97  (3d ed. 1993) (explaining that people have a tendency to give more to charity if 
they think others also give to charity); Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of 
Normative Conduct:  Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1015–16 (1990); Stanley Milgram et al., Response 
to Intrusion into Waiting Lines, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 683, 683 (1986) 
(analyzing the line as an example of society’s effort to create equity); Peter H. 
Reingen, Test of a List Procedure for Inducing Compliance with a Request to Donate Money, 
67 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 110, 110 (1982) (discussing the impact of social influence on 
people contributing to charity). 
 217.  Stefan Magen, Fairness and Reciprocity in Contract Governance 5 (Max Planck 
Inst. for Research on Collective Goods Preprint, Working paper No. 2013/21, 2013), 
available at https://www.econstor.eu/dspace/bitstream/10419/84986/1/769720838.pdf. 
 218.  Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 162–63; see also 
Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023, 1091 n.245 (2009) (“The observed preference for 
reciprocity is heterogeneous . . . ‘where some people exhibit reciprocal behavior 
and others are selfish.’”). 
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tasks ex ante is less costly than litigating a vague contract ex post, taking 
into consideration the probability that litigation will result.219 
This is all what traditional law and economics suggests.  But, 
experiments tying the reciprocity norm to contracting behavior belie 
much of this traditional view.220  Ernst Fehr and Simon Gächter, 
among others, have studied the question of whether changing 
contract design can cultivate social norms, in particular reciprocal 
responses, and have answered in the affirmative.221 
In one study, Fehr et al.  hypothesized that “reciprocal motivations 
and interactions could potentially ease incentive compatibility 
constraints” in contracts.222  They tested their theory in an 
experiment that simulated firms and workers.223  They designed two 
treatments, a weak reciprocity treatment and a strong reciprocity 
treatment.224  In the weak treatment, workers could respond 
reciprocally to firms’ actions, but the firms could not respond to the 
workers.225  On the other hand, in the strong treatment, both the firm 
and the workers could respond reciprocally to each other.226  The 
study found large efficiency gains in the strong reciprocity 
treatment.227  Workers shirked less, and firms enforced effort levels 
far above the incentive compatible level.228 
In another study, Fehr and Gächter tested how explicit material 
incentives to abide by the terms of the contract interact with 
motivations of fairness and reciprocity.229  There, the study compared 
implicit and explicit contracts.230  The implicit contract specified a 
fixed wage and a desired effort level, but made no incentive-based 
                                                          
 219.  See Magen, supra note 217, at 15–16 (discussing the efficiencies of ex ante 
and ex post negotiations).  
 220.   See id. at 14 (“With homo reciprocans contracting, contracts will be 
accompanied by expectations of fairness.  These fairness expectations might not be 
recognised by the law as relevant, but it is safe to assume that they influence the 
formation and execution of the contract by the parties and should hence be taken 
into account by Contract Governance.” (footnote omitted)). 
 221.  In more recent years, others have also studied whether contract choices “may 
signal information about the actions of other agents and thus create indirect effects 
on behavior.” Anastasia Danilov & Dirk Sliwka, Can Contracts Signal Social Norms?  
Experimental Evidence 3 (Inst. for the Study of Labor, Discussion Paper No. 7477, 
2013) (citing the economic models generated by Sliwka (2007), Friebel and 
Schnedler (2011), van der Weele (2012), and Bénabou and Tirole (2012)). 
 222.  Fehr et al., Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device, supra note 28, at 834. 
 223.  Id. at 835. 
 224.  Id. 
 225.  Id.  
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. at 835, 856. 
 228.  Id. at 856. 
 229.  Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 176. 
 230.  Id. at 176–78. 
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commitments.231  The principal was obligated to pay the wage 
regardless of the agent’s actual output level.232  The explicit contract 
also specified a wage and a desired output; however, it included an 
additional term whereby the principal could fine the agent in the 
case of shirking.233  The game had three stages.234  Principals chose 
contracts (explicit or implicit), agents agreed to contracts, and then 
agents chose an effort level.235 
The results were informative.  Principals who chose the explicit 
contract lost on average nine tokens per contract, compared to a 
profit of 26 tokens per implicit contract.236  The difference was 
attributable to effort levels.237  The agent’s effort level in the implicit 
contract was 5.2 on average (out of ten), while the effort level in the 
explicit contract was 2.1 on average.238  Similar results have been 
confirmed by other studies.239 
Why would it be the case that less explicit contracts prompt better 
agent performance?  Most experiments do little to answer this 
question.240  The prevailing theory is that less-specific contracts give 
                                                          
 231.  Although it made no commitment to do so, the principal had the option of 
paying a bonus after observing the agent’s effort level.  Id. at 176.   
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. 
 234.  Id. 
 235.  Id. at 176–77. 
 236.  Id. at 177. 
 237.  Id. 
 238.  Fehr & Gächter dismiss the possibility that the punishment versus reward 
distinction explains the result based on the results of further experiments.  Id. at 177.   
 239.  See, e.g., Bohnet et al., supra note 24, at 141 (asserting that lower levels of 
contract enforcement increase trustworthiness between contracting parties while 
economic incentives do not have the same effect); Fehr & Gächter, Crowd Out, supra 
note 33, at 26 (observing that voluntary cooperation may be crowded out by 
incentive contracts); Frey & Jegen, supra note 33, at 606 (finding empirical evidence 
for the idea that incentives and punishments crowd out intrinsic motivation); Kessler 
& Leider, supra note 33, at 76 (describing a laboratory experiment finding 
unenforceable “handshake” agreements to be most effective); Lubell & Scholz, supra 
note 33, at 167 (discovering that incentives created by institutions do not 
“counterbalance the temptation to free ride”); see also Scott, supra note 28, at 1644–
45 (speculating that parties write “deliberately incomplete contracts that rely on self-
enforcement” between strangers, which is a “more efficient . . . alternative . . . [than] 
more complete, legally enforceable agreements”). But cf. Rigdon, supra note 33, at 
102–03 (finding no evidence to support a hypothesis that motivating a worker with 
trust alone is more effective than incentives or punishments).  Put simply, these 
studies suggest that less specified contracts may prompt better performance than 
more explicit contracts that utilize incentive-based compensation even though 
higher effort levels are not in the agent’s rational self-interest.  Scott, supra note 28, 
at 1663 (“[E]xperimental evidence suggests that incompletely specified contracts 
that leave space for reciprocation can achieve higher levels of efficiency than more 
explicit, legally enforceable contracts.  These fairness values appear to interact with 
and complement the self-interest motivation of economic actors.”). 
 240.  Behavioral economics tries to predict responses but does not in general seek 
to answer the question of “why.” 
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agents more autonomy than more-specific ones and boost intrinsic 
motivation.241  Specificity in contracts, on the other hand, gives the 
agent the impression of lack of trust on the part of the principal.  
This theory is strengthened by other work.242  For instance, an 
experiment allowed a principal to either set a lower limit for 
production to bind an agent, or to give discretion to an agent to set a 
production amount.243  It then tested production amounts chosen by 
agents.244  The results indicated higher levels of production with the 
ambiguous instruction than with the lower limit.245  When the agents 
were questioned, most indicated perceiving the lower limit as a signal 
of distrust and hence behaved less cooperatively.246 
One possibility is that less-specific contracts frame the relationship 
from the outset as a cooperative one.  The so-called “Wall Street 
Game” or “Community Game,” demonstrated that simply changing 
the name of the social dilemma game significantly changed the 
results.247  In this experiment, American college students, Israeli 
pilots, and their flying instructors played a Prisoner’s Dilemma-type 
game where the participants chose to compete or cooperate in a 
number of stages.248  Those who were told they were playing “the 
Community Game” were found to be much more cooperative 
throughout the stages of the game than those who were told they 
were playing “the Wall Street Game.”249  Similarly, the tone set during 
contracting may persist for the duration of the parties’ relationship.  
                                                          
 241.  Chou et al., supra note 24, at 17–18 (asserting that less-specific contracts 
benefit both employees and employers); see also Edward L. Deci et al., Facilitating 
Internalization:  The Self-Determination Theory Perspective, 62 J. PERSONALITY 119, 140 
(1994) (extolling the benefits of self-determination:  enhanced creativity, 
productivity, and work satisfaction); Wendy S. Grolnick & Richard M. Ryan, Parent 
Styles Associated with Children’s Self-Regulation and Competence in School, 81 J. EDUC. 
PSYCHOL. 143, 152 (1989) (finding that children are more successful when parents 
support the child’s autonomy); Richard M. Ryan & Edward L. Deci, Self-Determination 
Theory and the Facilitation of Intrinsic Motivation, Social Development, and Well-Being, 55 
AM. PSYCHOL. 68, 76 (2000) (explaining that autonomy encourages intrinsic 
motivation, while controlled conditions undermine it). 
 242.  Armin Falk & Michael Kosfeld, The Hidden Costs of Control, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 
1611 (2006). 
 243.  Id. at 1611. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  Id. at 1612. 
 246.  Id. at 1611–12. 
 247.  Varda Liberman et al., The Name of the Game:  Predictive Power of Reputations 
Versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game Moves, 30 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1175, 1182 (2004). 
 248.  Id. at 1176, 1178. 
 249.  Id. at 1177 (finding that when playing the “Community Game,” more 
nominees cooperated, while when playing the “Wall Street Game,” only one-third of 
the same nominees cooperated). 
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Less specified contracts set a more positive tone than more highly 
detailed, control-based contracts.250 
Other studies have shown that strict enforcement, incentives, and 
sanctions can also harm cooperation.251  In general, much work has 
now suggested that intrinsic motivations can be crowded out by 
extrinsic ones.252  Fehr in particular has found that when people 
attribute their behavior to external rewards, they discount their other 
(social) incentives for behavior.253 
It is not only specificity that can crowd out intrinsic motivation.  
Studies have shown that the use of tangible rewards or sanctions 
undermines motivation for a range of activities.254  Use of incentives, 
such as incentive-based compensation (the so-called carrots and 
sticks), can damage self-esteem and harm the norms of 
professionalism, thus crowding out intrinsic motivation.255  Also, 
monitoring at a certain level decreases work effort.256  Monitoring and 
specificity together have been shown to be particularly problematic.257 
                                                          
 250.  See David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1796–97 (2007) (noting 
in the context of firm behavior that “negative attitudes toward cooperative behavior 
are always lurking in the background and must be proactively managed”). 
 251.  See Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Sanctioning Systems, Decision 
Frames, and Cooperation, 44 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 684, 704 (1999) (suggesting that 
sanctioning systems decrease cooperation and cause subjects to value economic 
incentives over moral ones). 
 252.  Bohnet et al., supra note 24, at 132 (“At intermediate levels [of 
enforcement], honesty is crowded out; more second movers breach, and resources 
are wasted in trials.”); Deci et al., Extrinsic Rewards, supra note 24, at 659 (“[R]eward 
contingencies undermine people’s taking responsibility for motivating or regulating 
themselves.”); Fehr & Gächter, Crowd Out, supra note 33, at 26 (describing their 
finding “that reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation may indeed be crowded out by 
incentive contracts”); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 3 (2000) (arguing that “the introduction of the fine changes the perception 
of people regarding the environment in which they operate,” but does not 
necessarily reduce penalized behavior); Daniel Houser et al., When Punishment Fails:  
Research on Sanctions, Intentions and Non-Cooperation, 62 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 509, 
522 (2008) (“Credible threats of sanctions often failed to produce cooperative 
behavior, and our evidence is that incentives, not intentions, underlie this effect.”); 
Chou et al., supra note 24, at 16. 
 253.  See, e.g., Fehr & Gächter, Crowd Out, supra note 33, at 26 (concluding that 
“reciprocity-driven voluntary cooperation” has been crowded out by incentive 
contracts); see also John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, CALIF. 
L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 32) (on file with author) (citing the work 
of Tom Tyler to show that law enforcement officers’ perceptions of legitimacy are 
shaped by their feelings about procedural fairness). 
 254.  See generally EDWARD DECI & RICHARD RYAN, INTRINSIC MOTIVATION AND SELF-
DETERMINATION IN HUMAN BEHAVIOR (1985) (describing how psychological needs, 
specifically self-determination and competence, drive human motivation). 
 255.  See Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 30, at 1400 (finding that paradoxically, 
introduction of formal enforcement increases shirking). 
 256.  See David Dickinson & Marie-Claire Villeval, Does Monitoring Decrease Work 
Effort?  The Complementarity Between Agency and Crowding-Out Theories, 63 GAMES & 
ECON. BEHAV. 56, 70 (2008) (finding that productivity is reduced when subjects are 
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Evidence on crowding out, however, is far from conclusive or 
without controversy.258  Some scholars have deemed it “thin.”259  The 
body of work is growing, but should nonetheless continue to be 
studied and confirmed. 
C. Support from Other Contexts 
While it may seem counter-intuitive that less is more in terms of 
motivating agents, there are interesting real-world examples of 
companies very successfully motivating their employees through less-
specific direction.260  For instance, Zappos grew a million-dollar 
business built on customer service without telling its call center 
employees what to say—an unheard of approach in the industry.261  
The approach resulted in a corporate culture that considered the 
highest level of customer service crucial to the company’s business 
model.262  This focus on customer service seems to have worked.  
Nordstrom, one of the most profitable retailers in the United States, 
took a similar approach for many years.  Their employment contract 
simply stated:  “Use best judgment in all situations.  There will be no 
additional rules.”263  In general, old models of motivation driven by 
                                                          
more heavily monitored); see also Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Motivation 
Governance, in HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION:  INTEGRATING ECONOMIC AND 
ORGANIZATION THEORY 26, 28 (Anna Grandori ed., 2013) (arguing that monetary 
incentives can negatively impact performance and reduce the joy a person feels from 
completing a task). 
 257.  “According to these theories, over time, the accuracy of measurement 
decreases as people concentrate their effort strictly on the measured components of 
an activity, resulting in a decline in the overall quality of their performance.  
Therefore, specificity combined with monitoring that focuses only on given 
measurable components (the letter of the law) seems to produce a straightforward 
effect of crowding out intrinsic motivation and decreasing overall performance.”  
Constantine Boussalis et al., An Experimental Analysis of the Effect of Specificity on 
Compliance and Performance 7 (2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 258.  Several studies do not find crowding out but rather see complementarity, 
including Sergio G. Lazzarini et al., Order with Some Law:  Complementarity Versus 
Substitution of Formal and Informal Arrangements, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 261, 290 (2004), 
and Rigdon, supra note 33, at 93, 102. 
 259.  Eric A. Posner, Book Note, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 509, 510 n.1 (2007) (reviewing 
ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN:  CONTRACT THEORY 
AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006), and criticizing the limited 
availability of cognitive psychology evidence for crowding-out theory); see also Yuval 
Feldman, The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations:  
Theoretical and Empirical Insights from the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 11, 23 (2011) (observing that alternative paradigms using different theoretical 
structures can produce similar results to those produced by the crowding-out theory). 
 260.  DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE:  THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US 
103 (2009). 
 261.  Id. at 103. 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  Chou et al., supra note 24, at 2. 
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carrots and sticks are passé.  Human motivation is largely intrinsic, 
and that impulse should be fostered.264 
The regulatory context provides additional real world support for 
the proposition that less specificity prompts higher levels of effort 
and innovation.  John Braithwaite famously studied nursing home 
regulations in Australia.265  He found that a standards-based regime 
resulted in higher quality service than a strict rules-based regime.266  
For instance, when nursing homes were told how many pieces of 
artwork to hang on the wall, they tore pages out of magazines and 
taped them to wall, complying with the letter of the requirement but 
certainly not its spirit.267  On the other hand, when nursing homes 
were told to create a home-like environment, they did a much better 
job complying with the spirit of the regulation.268 
A comparative study of the greening of the car industry in Japan 
and the United States is also instructive.269  Japan used a more 
standards-based approach, whereas the United States highly detailed 
its regulations.270  A study determined that the United States’ 
formalism undermined affirmative motivations.271  Results were 
significantly better under the Japanese approach.272  In general, the 
regulatory sphere has seen a move away from the traditional, 
formalist, command-and-control type regulation in the past decade.273 
The concept of providing less specification in privatization 
contracts is similar.  Privatization is designed to foster innovation, but 
contracting through detailed specification, monitoring, and 
incentive-based compensation crowds out the intrinsic motivation 
                                                          
 264.  PINK, supra note 260, at 9. 
 265.   John Braithwaite, supra note 34, at 61. 
 266.  See, e.g., id. at 75; John Braithwaite & Valerie Braithwaite, The Politics of Legalism:  
Rules Versus Standards in Nursing-Home Regulation, 4 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 307, 336 
(1995); Marilyn J. Rantz et al., Field Testing, Refinement, and Psychometric Evaluation of a 
New Measure of Nursing Home Care Quality, 14 J. NURSING MEASUREMENT 129, 144 (2006). 
 267.   Braithwaite, supra note 34, at 61.  
 268.  Id. 
 269.  MIKLER, supra note 34, at 2. 
 270.  Id. at 98, 101. 
 271.  Id. at 101.  
 272.  Id.; see also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation:  Private Firms, 
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 461 
(2006) (arguing that regulation of private firms should be more principal based and 
the specifics of how to achieve them should be delegated to the agent, especially for 
complex regulations). 
 273.  See, e.g., David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 265, 299–301 (2013) (noting the “[w]aning [a]ppeal of [c]ommand 
and [c]ontrol [r]egulation”). 
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required for innovation.274  Accordingly, governments should 
reconsider what has become the default approach. 
D. The Proposal:  Less-Specified Contracts 
The proposal this Article advances is a nuanced one.  Where 
mitigating agency cost through detailed contracts is unlikely to be 
effective for the reasons detailed in Part II, governments should try a 
less-specified contract design without use of incentive-based 
compensation.  Contracting parties are sensitive to intentions 
conveyed by contract language.  This Article suggests that 
governments might be better served by conveying positive intentions 
to the other party to a bilateral agreement—as in the Community 
Game/Wall Street Game experiments, framing the relationship as 
one based on collaboration rather than competition.  I focus on this 
particular problem in the government outsourcing context because it 
is an area of pressing need where current solutions are clearly not 
working.  But I leave open for another day the possibility that this 
proposal might have broader application. 
There is a spectrum along which contracts might specify tasks.  At 
one end, one could conceive of a contract that tries to detail every 
step, no matter how small, that an employee must take in processing 
an application for Medicaid benefits.  At the other end, one might 
imagine a contract that simply says “process applications for benefits.”  
This Article merely assumes that government service contracts are 
closer to the detailed pole than they should be.  But it does not 
suggest that contracts be drafted that are entirely devoid of guidance 
for the contractors.  Indeed, studies have found that when faced with 
ambiguity and the absence of goals, ambiguity will be used to justify 
moral hazard behavior.275  Subjects given distal and proximal goals do 
better than those simply instructed to “‘do [their] best.’”276 
To invoke the reciprocity norm, contracts should specify goals, but 
also create room for contractor discretion and innovation.277  Based 
                                                          
 274.  See Roland Bénabou & Jean Tirole, Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation, 70 REV. 
ECON. STUD. 489, 503 (2003) (finding that explicit incentive schemes can backfire, 
reducing motivation in the long term); see also Rappaport, supra note 253, at 32 
(discussing studies of police officers and concluding that officers who are treated 
fairly are motivated to be good organizational citizens). 
 275.  See Jason Dana et al., Exploiting Moral Wiggle Room:  Experiments Demonstrating 
an Illusory Preference for Fairness, 33 ECON. THEORY 67, 78 (2007) (finding that reduced 
transparency encouraged study participants to act in in their self-interest). 
 276.  Gary P. Latham & Gerard H. Seijts, The Effects of Proximal and Distal Goals on 
Performance on a Moderately Complex Task, 20 J. ORG. BEHAV. 421, 426 (1999). 
 277.  See id. (finding superior performance when goals combine with feelings of 
self-efficacy). 
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on study results, contractors are likely to react positively to the trust 
put in them to deliver quality service and to ascertain the best 
method of delivering that service and accomplishing the defined 
goal.278  This type of contracting device might reduce the possibility 
of opportunistic behavior by the agent rather than encouraging 
opportunism through vagueness. 
In the welfare benefits example, a less-detailed contract would 
establish price and contract duration.279  But, instead of specifying 
tasks, outcome measures, and incentives, it would set only broader 
parameters and goals to guide the relationship.  It would function 
essentially like a simple employment agreement, which sets 
compensation and defines the parameters of a role, but generally 
does not impose sanctions tied to specific tasks.  Similarly, a less 
detailed public-private contract would not specify particular tasks and 
exacting success metrics ex ante.  Rather, it would be more fluid, 
allowing the parties to chart the best, most flexible course during the 
term of the contract.280 
E. Possible Limitations and Future Study 
Despite the promise inherent in this new approach, it is difficult to 
argue that reciprocity norm experiments have any direct application 
to public-private contracting.  This Section flags some limitations in 
the approach and suggests areas where future study would bolster the 
preliminary conclusions of this Article. 
The most common critique of reciprocity is that it is a figment of 
lab work that does not translate to the real world.281  Actors in 
experiments might behave differently than they would in real work 
environments.  For instance, they might behave in a manner that they 
believe will please the experimenter.  The stakes may be artificially 
                                                          
 278.  Chou et al., supra note 24, at 3 (defining “less-specific contracts” as those that 
describe basic roles and rules and “more-specific contracts” as those that describe 
roles, rules, and contingencies in more elaborate detail). 
 279.  Note that the contracts would still have to have the necessary requirements 
to be enforced by a court. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 28, at 1643 (discussing a category 
of contracts that are so incomplete that courts refuse to enforce them pursuant to 
traditional contracts doctrine).  It may be more difficult to prove breach based on a 
low quality service provision absent explicit performance requirements. 
 280.  See Macneil, supra note 36, at 900 (advocating for planned flexibility in 
complicated contractual relationships, because these relationships will become 
dysfunctional if too tightly controlled). 
 281.  See, e.g., Francesco Guala, Reciprocity:  Weak or Strong?  What Punishment 
Experiments Do (and Do Not) Demonstrate, 35 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1, 1 (2012) (using 
reciprocity theory to explain the willingness of experimental subjects to punish 
uncooperative free-riders at personal cost); Scott, supra note 28, at 1672 (noting that 
reciprocity theory has not yet been tested seriously in real world contexts, though it is 
predictive in experimental settings). 
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low, leading to distortions in behavior.  On the other hand, they may 
be asked to put themselves in situations that are foreign and for 
which they have no expertise. 
Experimenters have tried to address some of these critiques by 
increasing the stakes in experiments and by using a diversity of test 
subjects, not just university students.282  Results in other studies are 
similar.  The possibility of trying to please the experimenter may 
indeed cause distortions, but the critique carries less weight against 
the backdrop of heterogeneous results where decision subjects make 
different choices.283  It is true that lab results must be taken with a grain 
of salt.  The real world case studies and regulatory context referenced 
above are helpful, but certainly the conclusions in this Article could be 
bolstered by additional work evaluating real world responses to less-
detailed contracts, particularly in the government setting. 
Another concern is that the studies of reciprocity in contracting 
generally test an employment relationship, where a single individual 
must decide how to react to contract language.  In the context of 
government service contracting, the government contracts with a 
large private firm.  It is difficult to know the extent to which a junior-
level employee conducting work pursuant to the contract knows what 
the language of the contract requires, or can be influenced by contract 
language choices.  Put more generally, the transferability of these results 
to firm-level behavior is somewhat attenuated.284  For incomplete 
contracts to have the desired effect, the reciprocity inclinations of firm 
leadership would have to be displayed by firm workers. 
There is reason to be optimistic, however, that the results are 
relevant to firm-firm interactions.  Even in firm-firm contracting, 
performance decisions are ultimately made by individuals.  For 
instance, one can look to the example of prisons making the decision 
to cut security or welfare administrators giving direction to cream 
applications.  In both cases, senior executives made the decisions and 
set the tone for those beneath them in the hierarchy.  Senior 
executives are individuals making decisions capable of being 
                                                          
 282.  See Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 161–62 
(providing examples of studies that found that higher monetary stakes either did not 
change the results or led to only minor impacts in negative reciprocity ultimatum 
games); Liberman at al., supra note 247, at 1182. 
 283.  See Scott, supra note 28, at 1648 (discussing the real-world challenges that 
economic actors confront, and noting that these externalities may influence 
contracting behavior).  
 284.  See Fehr & Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation, supra note 28, at 162–63 
(concluding that while experiments have shown that reciprocity is a common 
behavioral response for some people in certain circumstances, the extent to which it 
impacts individual interactions in firms, government, and markets is unclear). 
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influenced by contract language just as the individuals in the 
experimental literature.285  In the USIS example, executive leadership 
allegedly passed down the order to flush applications.286  It is easy to 
imagine that executive level leadership, in that case influenced by 
contractual provisions linking pay to completed background checks, 
could be influenced by changing the contract structure.  If USIS 
leadership took a different approach, that approach would influence 
more junior level employees.287 
Another concern is that these studies do not truly test how clarity 
of objective (i.e. specifying tasks rather than simply broad standards) 
plays into performance quality.288  One reason that scholars advocate 
for task specification is that clarity is thought to mitigate conflict.289  
Agents with a clear sense of purpose are thought to better meet their 
objectives.  Contractors given unconstrained discretion might 
innovate and deliver quality service, or they might jump at the “hole” 
in task definition and act opportunistically.290  Contract 
incompleteness in some literature has been equated with a risk of 
increased litigation for precisely these reasons.291 
                                                          
 285.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation:  Vertical 
Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 487 n.144 (2009) 
(explaining that while the experiments cited describe individual behavior and not 
the behavior of firms, the findings should be relevant to those institutions because 
the individuals in the simulated collaborative process are personally invested in the 
success of the project); see also Van Slyke, Agents or Stewards, supra note 51, at 164 
(defining stewardship theory as situations in which managers act as “stewards” who 
put the objectives of their principles before their own individual goals). 
 286.  See supra notes 8–16 and accompanying text. 
 287.  A recent study looked at a related issue, evaluating the extent to which an 
individual breaching a contract is seen as having committed a moral transgression, 
whereas a firm breaching is viewed as having made a legitimate business decision.  
Uriel Haran, A Person—Organization Discontinuity in Contract Perception:  Why 
Corporations Can Get Away with Breaking Contracts But Individuals Cannot, 59 MGMT. SCI. 
2837, 2839, 2844, 2851 (2013).  The study found that  “some actions are equally 
regarded as moral transgressions when committed by either individuals or 
organizations.”  Id. at 2844.  As such, “the formation of an explicit association 
between the contract and a promise—accomplished by phrasing organizational 
contractual obligations in promise terms—can eliminate the discrepancies between 
people’s reactions to contract breaches by organizations versus those by individuals.”  
Id. at 2839.  The study looks at perception of behavior rather than impact on actual 
behavior, but the results suggest phrasing contracts in terms of promise may affect 
results.  Id. at 2851.  
 288.  Gilson et al., Braiding, supra note 30, at 1390. 
 289.  Id. at 1391 (addressing the choices that parties must make regarding 
renegotiation of contractual rights when formal contract enforcement breaks down); 
see also Boussalis et al., supra note 257, at 6–7 (suggesting “that when specificity helps 
provide clear instructions . . . it is superior to ambiguous standards or instructions”). 
 290.  Work has shown, for instance, that parties are more likely to act 
opportunistically when they can rationalize that the contract was ambiguous.  
Boussalis et al., supra note 257, at 6–7.  
 291.  See Scott, supra note 28, at 1643 (analyzing a sample of incomplete contracts 
and noting “a surprisingly high volume of litigation”).   
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Although this criticism is valid because the reciprocity studies do 
not address the role of task specification in performance, they do 
demonstrate that agents who could have acted opportunistically by 
exerting minimal levels of effort did not so.  In theory, if agents are 
satisfied with the contracting relationship and the discretion to meet 
high-level objectives, they may ultimately perform better and perhaps 
innovate to save costs rather than decrease quality of service.  These 
issues require further testing. 
A related issue has to do with monitoring.  Monitoring is 
dependent, so the argument goes, on knowing what the monitors are 
looking for (i.e. task specification).  The idea, however, is that 
monitoring will be less necessary because the agent will be 
intrinsically motivated.292  Also, monitoring may be more successful 
without strict and detailed contract language because it will be more 
collaborative and cooperative in nature.  The idea that monitoring is 
more successful with an underlying detailed contract is a fallacy, as 
discussed above. 
Another argument for specification over reciprocity is that 
specification is beneficial if litigation does result.  It would be both 
more costly and more difficult to litigate a breach of contract action 
where the contract is less specific.  Also, it may be hard to imagine a 
lawyer who, anticipating potential litigation ex post, would counsel a 
client to make his or contract less detailed. 
These, too, are valid concerns, although at base, they harken back 
to the basic standards versus rules debate.  Courts are frequently 
tasked with adjudicating standards.  It might be more costly to 
adjudicate a contract that is more standard-like than rule-like,293 but 
that tradeoff might be worthwhile in a cost-benefit analysis if a more 
standard-like contract is also less likely to result in litigation because 
the principal will be happier with the agent’s effort level compared to 
a rule-like regime.294  Also important to consider is that less-detailed 
contracts are less costly to draft ex ante. 
As mentioned earlier, there are additional reasons that parties 
might prefer specificity.  For instance, politicians might prefer more 
                                                          
 292.  See Rappaport, supra note 253, at 32 (observing that “voluntary deference 
yields good behavior even when officers know they are not being watched”). 
 293.  However, there are lots of shades of grey in this question.  In cases where 
contracts seem to be detailed and clear, the modern approach is to nonetheless allow 
parties to introduce extrinsic evidence. 
 294.  See, e.g., George Triantis, Exploring the Limits of Contract Design in Debt 
Financing, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 2041, 2045–46 (2013) (arguing that standards like good 
faith that convey discretion to the court can be effective tools if the reason for 
contract incompleteness is cost of specification ex ante but this introduces the risk of 
high cost litigation and judicial error). 
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detailed contracts for reasons of public accountability or to have 
benchmarks to prove success.  These mechanisms are only effective 
though if the public is attuned to these contracts and if benchmarks 
are easy to discern, which is often not the case. 
Contractors too might want more detailed contracts so that they 
have better information on which to base their bids.  Without a 
detailed contract, some might worry about preventing corruption295 
or a race to the bottom based on price. 
The problem, again, is that detailed contracts have not proven to 
be particularly effective at mitigating these concerns.  This is 
particularly true where there is a thin market for services.  Many of 
the examples cited in this paper are ones where there was only one 
bidder for the work. 
Reciprocity-based contracting may not solve every problem 
inherent in government contracting.  But it holds much promise and 
the government should experiment with this new method. 
CONCLUSION 
Contracts for complex government services only continue to grow 
in use.  That such contracts often result in cost reduction at the 
sacrifice of service quality is a dire problem, particularly when 
governments are outsourcing services such as national security, 
prison and public benefits administration, and education. 
Private service providers engage in opportunistic behavior that 
reduces service quality because of misaligned incentives and 
unconstrained agency costs.  The private service provider is interested 
in maximizing profit while the government is interested in the agent 
providing quality service.  Agency theory suggests that the way to 
mitigate such costs is to align incentives.  The traditional method for 
aligning incentives in similar scenarios is to detail tasks, monitor to 
ensure compliance, and reward (or punish) compliance with 
financial incentives. 
However, the traditional method is ill-suited to mitigate agency 
costs for certain types of contracts for government service.  For many 
of these contracts, it is difficult and costly both to specify tasks and to 
monitor performance.  A thin market also cuts against use of the 
traditional method, as does the prevalence of corruption. 
This Article suggested that the traditional approach is based on an 
assumption that agents are rational actors looking for opportunities 
to shirk and this may be a misunderstanding of human nature.  
                                                          
 295.  Corruption is a problem that neither model adequately solves.   
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Governments should instead look to research on the reciprocity 
norm in contracting and draft less-detailed contracts.  At the very 
least, we should consider a solution that fosters the collaborative 
rather than the competitive instincts of private service providers.  
Studies have shown that less-detailed contracts where agents are left 
more discretion and more room to innovate generate better agent 
performance than more detailed contracts.  The studies are not 
without limitation, but contracting parties would be remiss to continue 
to function as if increasing contract specification is the clear choice. 
 
